

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 102 039

SO 007 973

AUTHOR Huntley, James Robert, Ed.
TITLE Teaching About Collective Security and Conflict.
INSTITUTION Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London
(England).
PUB DATE 71
NOTE 70p.
AVAILABLE FROM Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, 37A High
Street, Wimbledon, London, England SW195BY (\$1.85)
EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.76 HC Not Available from EDRS. PLUS POSTAGE
DESCRIPTORS *Conflict Resolution; Curriculum Development; Foreign
Policy; *Foreign Relations; Futures (of Society);
*Global Approach; Instructional Innovation;
International Education; Nationalism; Peace;
Political Power; Political Science; Social Studies;
Systems Approach; *Teaching Methods; Technological
Advancement; Values; *World Affairs
IDENTIFIERS *Collective Security

ABSTRACT

Presentations from an International Seminar for Teachers organized at Rungstedgaard in October 1971 are included in this report. The study conference presented seven approaches to the teaching of world affairs: (1) the nation-state which is still dominant on the world scene; (2) the strategy and power-politics relationship between states; (3) the systems theory, in which an integrated complex of interdependent parts--such as the world transportation network--is studied as an interacting whole; (4) peace research and conflict resolution--the causes of war, the conditions of peace, and the changing of attitudes; (5) the role of technology; (6) the concept of collective security--something more than a classical alliance, yet less than a global supranational government; and (7) the relationship between values and foreign policy. Summary discussions following each presentation include the diverse opinions of the Rungstedgaard group as to the proper approach for teaching about conflict and security. Appendixes provide a list of participants, materials for the teachers, and some addresses for teaching aids and information. (Author/DE)

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Teaching about Collective Security and Conflict

A Report from the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers

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THE WORLD AND THE SCHOOL 70p \$1.85

Published three times a year by The Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers.

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ED102039

Teaching about Collective Security and Conflict

*Report of an
International Seminar for Teachers
organised at Rungstedgaard,
near Copenhagen,
by the Atlantic Information
Centre for Teachers
28-31 October 1971*

Edited by James Robert Huntley

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Introduction

Much is demanded of teachers whose job it is to help pupils understand problems of conflict and security on an international scale. Never before have events in distant parts of the world had such an impact on people in other places. Never before in modern times have conflict and violence seemed to be such an everyday part of almost everybody's lives. Never before have teachers been asked to know so much, or to deal with masses of phenomena which change so rapidly. Never before have there been such strong outside influences (TV, for example) which threaten to take over—at least in part—the teacher's (or the parent's) job.

The old days, when a history teacher taught dates and battles and great men, or a geography teacher taught quaint folkways and coloured countries on a map, are gone forever. Reality is more complex today, and the increasingly sophisticated theories and techniques of the academics reflect this. Fortunately for the teacher, a variety of approaches to the teaching of world affairs is now available, and more are being developed.

The Study Conference at Rungstedgaard presented six possible approaches: *the first* dealt with *the nation-state*, for 200 years the largely uncontested chief actor on the world stage. The nation-state may now be obsolescent, but majority opinion at the Conference agreed that it was still dominant.

A second approach, closely related to that of the nation-state, is the study of *strategy and power-politics* relationships between states. This method concentrates on force as an intrinsic, fundamental element in the international system, and seeks to explain its use and control.

A third avenue for teaching international relations uses *systems theory*, in which an integrated complex of interdependent parts—such as the world transportation network—is studied as an interacting whole. This approach has been made both necessary and possible by the emergence of an incipient world-wide society.

The *peace research and conflict resolution* school represents *a fourth way* of thinking and teaching about international affairs. Here, the causes of war, the conditions of peace, and the changing of attitudes (as a means of establishing the conditions of peace) are important elements.

A fifth approach studied at Rungstedgaard put the emphasis on the *role of technology in world affairs*, on the changing job of the scientist/technologist, and on his education.

Finally, the *concept of collective security*—something more than a classical alliance, yet less than a global supranational government—was explored as one of the major approaches to the containment of international conflict over the past half-century.

As the reader will note in the pages which follow, the discussions at Rungstedgaard were far from limpid. Each approach found its protagonists and detractors, its enthusiasts and critics. It seemed evident, when the smoke of

intellectual battle had cleared, that no single approach, alone, could give a fair approximation of today's world for the pupil. Therefore, as the seminar progressed, teachers and university professors (of whom the proportion was about two-thirds to one-third) evolved towards a kind of synthesis:

An adequate curriculum for teaching about conflict and security could make good use of all these approaches. The nation-state and power politics are still important realities. Systems theory is an ingenious way to demonstrate the growing interdependence of peoples and nations. (Conceivably, it might offer a way of utilising all the other approaches, too, which after all also represent 'systems'.) Peace research is important in helping pupils to think constructively about the future. An understanding of technology as a force in human affairs seems indispensable to learning about the world as it is and as it will be. And teaching about collective (or mutual) security highlights one of the practical and at least partially successful methods which nations are developing to mitigate inter-state conflicts and maintain a modicum of stability while the world searches for a better form of order.

An imaginative teacher might use still *other approaches* than those discussed at Rungstedgaard. One highly significant new development, with broad implications for international law, supranationalism and economic integration is the Common Market. Other technical and economic bodies such as OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), ESRO (European Space Research Organisation), and EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) are worthy of attention in this context. *Regional integration*, especially as it is developing in Western Europe, may be a kind of half-way house on the way from a world of sovereign nation-states to an international system of workable political and economic interdependence.

Another approach, also not mentioned at Rungstedgaard, might be called *the development approach* to international relations. This proceeds from hypotheses about economic, political, and social development of peoples and cultures. The rate and level of civic development, in particular, appear to be of importance in determining the capacity of a society or nation for international intercourse, and thus can affect prospects for security or conflict.

A warning, suggested by remarks of Prof Andrén after the conference, might be in order here: to some extent, some adherents of one 'approach' or another tend to use their favoured method as a means of propagating their own political views about the world. Some appear to advocate one approach because they believe war is wrong; others may prefer another approach because they think it better explains a 'realistic' world in which war and conflict are still very much a part of human relationships. The essential task of the pedagogue, it would seem to me, is to try to use a balanced 'mix' of approaches, each as an analytical tool and—insofar as possible—not as a means of political advocacy. But we shall return to this little problem farther on.

Taken together, all these approaches, with their complexity and their unanswered questions, challenge today's teacher to convey to his pupils that we live in a world of dilemmas, paradoxes, and—often—insoluble problems. Indeed, to help youngsters make some sense of conflict and security on a world scale may require more than a single teacher can give; it may require *teaching teams*. It may also require *substantial* terms or years for secondary school teachers, so that they can have time to study, reflect, and research new developments.

Even more important, the Conference reflected the urgency—and the difficulty—of *changing outmoded curricula*. In all countries, and in some more than others, there appears to be a curriculum gap which seriously inhibits the instructor's ability to teach effectively about world affairs.

Finally, the Rungstedgaard Conference raised questions with broad moral and ethical implications.

There appear to be limits, for example, to teaching about a 'better world', which most of us might like but which does not exist. Theoretically, at least, one could concentrate entirely on 'educating for World Citizenship' and hope that thereby the attitudes of future generations would be significantly different from those of the present, opening up new possibilities for international security systems and indeed human relationships overall. Yet, if even one or two major powers failed to introduce this kind of teaching into *their* curricula, those powers which did so might find themselves at a severe psychological disadvantage. By the rules of the old power-politics system, the 'educationally backward' powers could readily dominate peoples who had turned their backs entirely on the old system.

This paradox suggests that today's teacher, at any rate, might do best to work from both ends of the dilemma: on the one hand, explaining the present imperfect and hazardous state of affairs, with reliance on the nation-state, alliances, treaties, regional collective security, tenuous agreements for cooperation, and the like, as essential until better systems can be worked out. On the other hand, the need to show the inadequacies of the existing system and to instil both hope and resolution that men could and must do better, seems evident too.

Teachers of course face severe problems in trying to depict for their pupils world systems 'which might be'. In some cases, such future projections (e.g. for a World Government) do not fit easily into a curriculum designed to serve and strengthen the nation-state. Also, the fine line between exposition and advocacy can easily be crossed by the forward-looking teacher, who in any event (as the Conference discussions demonstrated) nearly always has difficulty with the concepts of *neutrality* and *objectivity* in teaching. Closely related is the problem of determining what 'reality' is; if there are different realities, each more or less valid; or if there are different ways of looking at reality; or if an important question isn't '*whose* reality?'

The discussions raised still another particularly difficult problem for the teacher, i.e., to explain the place of violence in the social scheme of things. Is it really true that all 'progress'—moral, social and otherwise—stems from violence, or at any rate from conflict? Is an 'unbearable injustice' sufficient justification for individuals or groups to resort to violence against authority? When is violence 'legitimate'? Rungstedgaard raised all these questions, but provided no easy answers.

More than anything, Rungstedgaard brought out to this writer the necessity for greater efforts, within and among national education systems, to integrate what is already known about the nature of international affairs into a more useful body of knowledge for the teacher. Meetings just such as this, bringing university researchers and professors together with secondary school teachers and officials, can be of immense help. But the future in any case is bound to call on great reserves of both energy and wisdom.

James Robert Huntley
General Rapporteur

The seminar owed much of its success to the support of the Dutch Atlantic Committee which also provided very generous hospitality for the participants, including a visit to the Royal Ballet in Copenhagen and readings from Hans Christian Andersen by Mr Erik Mørk of the Royal Theatre.

The staff of the Rungsted Conference Centre deserve praise and thanks for their efficient service.

The seminar is also indebted to the NATO Information Service for a grant-in-aid which assisted the organisation and preparation of the seminar.

At the official level the seminar was glad to welcome Mr Niels Matthiasen, the Minister of Cultural Affairs, who met the participants at the opening reception and Mr E. Drostby, Head of the International Relations Division at the Ministry of Education, who attended the closing dinner.

The Nation State, Obsolete or Dominant?

By James Becker, Social Studies Development Center,
Indiana University

The explorers of space, poets, sociologists, and journalists remind us that we are all riders together on this small planet. The spectacular view of the earth from the moon dramatises the fact that science has changed both the physical environment and human society so much in such a short period of time, that many of our attitudes, our habits, and our institutions have become dangerously outmoded. Perhaps the most dangerous lag in our time is the failure of nation-states to come to grips with the imperatives of globalism. Mankind has developed a system of national allegiances and national sovereignties which recognise and serve national interests as the supreme good. (This may have to change if man is to survive on earth.)

H. Lasswell has pointed out that '... all men are by birth human. They belong potentially to the nation of man. But at birth all men are absorbed into territorial and pluralistic groups whose members may deny the claim of the whole community to have the final word in conflicts among these lesser entities'.¹

Eric Fromm² tells us man cannot do without human groups. Self-love or social narcissism is necessary for group survival, but its form may be either benign or malignant. The chauvinistic love of the group merely because it exists is a major obstacle to building and maintaining relationships with other groups.

The strength of nationalism may be waning. The increased openness about feelings and identification may help man overcome some of his more destructive and hostile motivations that underline nationalism. None the less, the world still has a lot of nationalistic bitterness to live down before better communication, easier translation, and greater understanding of human motivations make it seem natural for people to react to one another as human to human across ethnic and national lines.

The penetrating influence of technology also undermines traditional ways of thinking and doing, and makes obvious the need for drastic changes in attitudes. The 'superculture' of airports, expressways, birth control, artificial fertilisers, skyscrapers and universities is world-wide in scope, with science its common ideology. It raises doubts in the minds of many, especially the young, about the relevance of nationalism in the present world system.

While we may be impressed by the evidence of the emerging 'superculture' and world society, the grim fact remains that nation-states now have the power to create nobly or to destroy instantly. Yet in many respects relations among nations are conducted as they were centuries ago. The long history of war and civil strife which previous generations regarded as tolerable has brought us to a point where war has become so destructive of man and his environment that it is no longer either rational or tolerable.

Historically, the modern nation-state with its peculiar unity and compactness was characterised by an expanse of territory encircled by barriers that rendered it more or less secure from foreign penetration. Traditional power concepts considered states as politically independent, legally sovereign entities and these concepts served to measure, grade and compare them. The strategies, political organisation, and legal structures of nation-states were bound up in this impermeability. Herz has stated that "Throughout history, that unit which affords

protection and security to human beings has tended to become the basic political unit; people, in the long run, will recognise that authority, which possesses the power of protection'.³

Today, however, the power to penetrate or by-pass the 'protected shell' has rendered the traditional defence structure of nations obsolete. The advent of nuclear weapons and modern missile systems with unlimited range, supersonic speed, and automatic guidance has obliterated the relative security of the territorial state, and has thereby generated a totally new set of conditions for world politics. No government, whether its territory spans a continent or is smaller than a village, can any longer protect and defend citizens from attack from the outside. The new 'make believe' or mini-states may be political absurdities and defenceless against the threat of instant annihilation. But so are the superpowers; the might of the superpowers is much too great to be used. If all one has to swat mosquitoes is a hundred-ton drop hammer, one is defenceless. As a result, these governments overreact and underachieve. Their might, while great enough to annihilate us all, is inappropriate to the political task.

Because of this unprecedented set of circumstances, the most powerful nations may paradoxically also be the most vulnerable. The last three presidents of the United States have as much as admitted that the government cannot defend the American people from nuclear attack. In fact, one might persuasively argue that governments can only endanger people by making them hostages in power confrontations. Much of what is proposed in the name of national security not only fails to protect citizens but actually increases the danger to their lives. Without the ability to protect its citizens, a national government has lost an important basis for authority—and perhaps its very *raison d'être*. According to Hans Morgenthau⁴ 'the nation-state as presently constituted has become the greatest threat to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness of the individual citizen'. He refers to the present situation as a 'momentous paradox'. Namely, that modern technology has made the nation-state as obsolete a principle of political organisation as the first industrial revolution did of the feudal principle of political organisation. Yet the nation-state is triumphant throughout the world. In 1900 there were fewer than 50 sovereignties. Today there are more than 150, with new states joining the ranks almost every month. We are frequenting the world with governmental pygmies, each with power over its citizens but incapable of governing. Is the nation-state obsolete or dominant? There is considerable evidence to support the contention that it is both, although its dominance is being challenged. The older generation may still cherish and teach in their classrooms the illusions of effective power and grandeur, but the younger generation sees it as a monstrosity and disorganised, ineffective, and impotent in the face of today's challenges.

In the nuclear age even the notion of collective security—which may seem to be a radical departure from traditional power politics—seems unlikely to be able to provide 'territorial integrity and political independence' against external aggression. Attempts to provide collectively for the security of individual nations may further erode the power and authority of the state without increasing the security of its citizens. As inhabitants of a small planet, which we are capable of destroying, we are unlikely to increase our security by working to augment the power of individual nations.

The presence, especially since World War II, of deep ideological conflicts heightens the tensions and conflicts which normally spring from national interests. Yet the dread power of nuclear weapons prevents us from trying to resolve these conflicts by widespread violence. The resulting confusion, brinkmanship, animosity, and limited war bespeak the dilemma of the contemporary world. Betty Reardon pointed out that 'It is man organised into the

nation-state competing with other nation-states that perpetuates this costly, dehumanising and potentially disastrous political practice⁵ known as the war system. If this trend continues, it seems at best it will lead to an aggravation of anarchy already prevalent in much of the third world; at worst, it is likely to lead to a military confrontation which could destroy us all. Outmoded and dangerous would seem to be the most accurate description of such an institution.

It is well to realise, however, that technological developments in weapons systems are far from the only factor challenging the international dominance of nation-states and hastening their obsolescence. The rapid growth of all kinds of international organisations may pose just as important a challenge. Transitional organisations today literally number in the thousands, including some 230 intergovernmental organisations, 2,400 nongovernmental organisations, and several thousand international business organisations. Multinational corporations, the newest and potentially most powerful of these groups, are creating vast and influential business empires controlling more wealth than do most individual nations. These corporations, like any unit of a multinational enterprise operating in the territory of a sovereign state, respond not only to the goals of the host country but also to commands from outside. The tensions created by the struggle of power against national sovereignty seem unlikely to strengthen the position of the nation-state, to say the least.

The spectacular increase in transnational participation is also working to undermine the predominance of nation-states. Wedge⁶ has pointed out the enormous intensification of the flow of information due to technical innovations. The transistor radio and communication satellites, among many instruments of communication, have increased political participation by bringing instant information about world affairs to populations heretofore largely isolated. These new participants may not be sophisticated in the ways of the educated Westerner and may be even more prone to the type of misunderstanding which often occurs when information crosses boundaries separating national cultures. None the less, governments are finding it increasingly difficult to control the flow of information to their constituents, and those governments opposing freedom of access to information may well face serious challenges in the future.

At the same time, the importance and weight of world public opinion seems likely to grow, forcing governments to pay attention to multiple audiences. Domestic discontent, revolt, and repression do not produce good impressions in foreign newspapers, and many nations may feel compelled to modify their behaviour in accord with the pressure of world opinion. Moreover, the accessibility of information about different and, in some cases, more attractive life styles will fan popular discontent. And as the multiplication of channels of information increases awareness of similar ideas or interests, new networks of international solidarity are likely to be formed. The selective diffusion of common standards and the gradual emergence of a world culture can hardly fail to hasten the demise of the nation-state.

In this context, the regular interaction of citizens from many countries in situations other than tourism seems especially noteworthy. It is perhaps too soon to gauge the impact that transnational participation by hundreds of thousands of individuals will have on national governments. The involvement of people in the international system may not be as wide or as deep as involvement in the national system, but it may be sufficient to begin breaking down narrow nationalisms and to encourage multiple loyalties and the development of multiple roles, thereby giving rise to attitudes that will further erode the dominance of the nation-state in international affairs.

Transnational activities transcending narrow, petty boundaries are often these days accompanied by a fragmentation of larger units into petty, parochial sub-national units. This development is apparent in cases such as demands

relating to French Canada, independent Flanders, black separatists or Scots nationalism.

To the eroding effects of nuclear weapons, the growing transnational contacts and affinities, and the fragmenting of the world into mini-states, must be added another cause of the nation-state's diminished prestige: its seeming inability to cope with the most pressing needs and wants facing the world today.

The prevention of abuses of the environment, intelligent use of the sea-bed resources, modification of climate, uses of outer space, halting the threat of nuclear destruction—all require some multinational framework for effective planning and action. Recent events demonstrate that we have no effective agency for limiting armaments or promoting world order.

Examination of figures on world military expenditures in the latter part of the first development decade reflects the inability of nations of the world to shift public expenditures from military to more constructive channels. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports⁷ an increase of 27 per cent in world military expenditures between 1964 and 1969. In the same period, multilateral aid disbursements increased 23 per cent. When bilateral economic aid is added to multilateral aid disbursements (making a total of 8 billion dollars) global economic aid is only 4 per cent of global military expenditures and 7 per cent of NATO military expenditures. In 1968 world military expenditures were \$182 billion.

As national, regional, and global organisations grapple with these problems and try to fashion effective agreements for working with each other, problems of integration and of functional organisation, related to world-wide concerns in fields such as health, hunger, and education, continue to pop up. Trying to coordinate policies of more than a hundred nations may prove more difficult than integrating the policies of a dozen or so functional activities in rather similar global environments.

In spite of large expenditures, for example, attempts by the United States to impose its vision of a stable world through military and economic power, especially in south-east Asia, have not been a spectacular success. Furthermore, in the process it may well have created more revolutionaries both at home and abroad than it has destroyed.

In the area of development the inadequacy of the nation-state system is even more obvious. Depressing statistics are constantly flashed at us depicting high illiteracy rates, food deficiencies, alarming population increases, scandalous infant mortality rates, and growing economic gaps. Barnett⁸ has pointed out that the claim that developed and poor countries would get rich together has proved to be only half-true. A convincing case can be made that the increasing standard of living in developed countries rests on a set of international political and economic relationships that keep poor countries from effectively improving their economic situation. Ironically many of these conditions exist not only in the developing nations but also in the wealthiest and most technologically-developed nations.

Nations are not known for their philanthropy. Politicians are unlikely to be elected by advocating the kind of serious dislocation in the domestic economy that would be necessary to reduce the gap between the rich and poor. Some rich nations as presently organised have enough difficulty trying to improve economic conditions in their own cities and backward rural areas. Efforts to build regional groups for economic purposes have been delayed or prevented by the nation-state concept. Denis de Rougemont⁹ points out that, 'nothing, then, is more hostile to any form of union however important and sincere than this nation-state which shows itself incapable of responding to the concrete needs of our time. It is too small to act on a world scale, too big to permit any

real civic participation. Any correspondence to any economic area defined by the nature of things or by rational planning is purely coincidental'.

The rise of the multinational corporation is evidence that even in the area of developing and protecting overseas markets the nation-state has become out-moded and ineffective. The modern businessman is a global planner who cannot afford to cut himself off from all the potential customers his government may consider enemies. Increasingly, businessmen are looking to private international organisations and arrangements to improve the global climate for economic growth.¹⁰

Governments, of course, continue to grapple with this problem also. A recent Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate may be symbolic here; included in its title is, 'the World as a Developing Country'. Citing the two overriding problems confronting the world community; (i) the tremendous economic gap between developed and under-developed nations, and (ii) the continuing build-up in world armaments, this report proposes we should look upon the world community as a developing nation. 'Its government the United Nations—is embryonic and almost incidental to the needs of its constituency; its distribution of wealth lopsided, and the gulf between its rich and poor increases at near geometrical proportions; its benefits are often wasted on imagined threats; and its vested interests resist meaningful reform.'¹¹ Ironically this seems an apt description of much of the behaviour of nation-states, whether developed or developing.

We already live in a transnational world where political boundaries and jurisdictions of governmental unity are of less importance than in the past. Posvar¹² has pointed out that 'the true map of Germany and Eastern Europe need not be one that traces only political boundaries' but could 'be drawn to show peoples with shared ethnic and cultural interests, and overlapping social and economic concerns'. Dr Burton raises the question 'which is the more representative model of the world—the world of continents, islands and states or the world of transactions?' The fact that such images and questions are being widely discussed are indicative of challenges to more traditional approaches.

Contemporary changes in the international system means everywhere is now accessible to everybody. People everywhere can now see and hear each other. There are no nooks, corners or retreats left and no snugly protected centres of national power. The result is a dramatic collapse of the viability of the nation-state.

No country today has the power to protect or to assure prosperity in isolation. To gain control over our destiny our sovereignty must be pooled with other nations in various international organisations. It is a matter of getting back the capacity to manage our affairs by mutual restraints and reciprocal concessions worked out with other countries under multilateral auspices. As a form, the nation-state is obsolete. It is still with us, however, and it neither can nor should be suddenly eliminated. Enlightened self-interest nevertheless argues that we begin moving toward new forms, that we learn to discard our yesterdays.

In his final annual report to the United Nations, U Thant called attention to the fact that 'governments, systems, ideologies, and institutions come and go, but humanity remains'. 'Humanity above all nations' reads an inscription carved on a stone bench at Duke University. Planetary survival may well depend upon how quickly we heed these words and recognise the need for a wider and more varied human identity than that provided by the increasingly obsolescent nation-state.

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Summary of the discussion

Comments by Professor Dr Bonifacio de Miranda: 1. The term 'nation-state', used by Mr Becker, calls for an explanation. Does it mean a particular type of state as distinguished from other types?

The term nation has changed its connotation in the course of time. On the other hand, there are those who say that the Soviet Union, for example, is neither a nation nor a state in the currently accepted sense of these terms. Hence the necessity of defining the term nation-state. Does it simply mean nationalism as contrasted with inter-nationalism?

2. It is difficult to accept the assertion that historically nation-states were 'encircled by barriers', were 'more or less secure from foreign penetration' and bound up in 'impermeability'. One would rather agree with Dean Inge when he says that 'the history of nations is a dismal conjugation of the verb *to eat* in the active and the passive voice'. 'There was no more 'a protective shell' in former days than there is today. In fact, it may be said that today there is a more widespread horror of war and international arrangements have been devised to avoid it. That these arrangements have failed, only shows that the world is not ripe for internationalism.

3. After alluding to the present vulnerability of the most powerful nations, the paper asserts that 'without the ability to protect its citizens, a national government has lost an important basis for authority—and perhaps its very *raison d'être*'. The ability to protect its citizens from external attacks is neither the 'basis for authority' nor the *raison d'être* of a national government. It is true, however, that the ability to preserve law and order *internally qualifies* a particular national government for authority. The problem of inability to protect one's citizens from external attacks is not new and the argument against national government does not gain anything qualitatively, because such inability has to be predicated today for 'the most powerful nations' as well. Inability to protect one's citizens from external attacks is not an argument against the existence of the system of national governments *as such*, unless it can be proved, on the one hand, that the system as such does not fulfil any other useful function and, on the other hand, that it *necessarily* leads to wars. In other words, one should not identify the system of national governments with chauvinism, imperialism, and such other aberrations of 'narrow nationalism'.

4. As regards international and transnational organisations, they are accepted only so long as the national sovereignty of their members is respected. It is

true that every international obligation freely accepted by a country restricts its national sovereignty to that extent. But then only such obligations are accepted as are not incompatible with the preservation of the essence of national sovereignty. Hence it is not to be supposed that international and transnational organisations, whatever their purpose, will provoke an erosion of sovereignty. On the contrary, they provide occasions for making individual members all the more jealous of their national sovereignty. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that international political organisations have been a failure. This fact does not encourage confidence in internationalism, rather the contrary.

5. It may be readily agreed that business connections, tourism, flow of information, interchange of technical know-how, all these are factors which promote closer international co-operation, 'break down narrow nationalism'. It is even more likely that 'inability to cope with the most pressing needs and wants facing the world today' will contribute powerfully to convince mankind of the importance of international cooperation. In the process and at least to the extent of that cooperation, the danger of war will recede and there will be less cause to complain that the system of national governments provokes wars or is unable to protect citizens against external attacks. The main objection to the system of national governments having thus lost force, these will emerge with added prestige. After all, nobody is better able to understand the needs and protect the interests of a social aggregate than its own government.

6. The system of national government continues to correspond to the organisational needs of human society. Like every other human institution, it has its defects. But there is no indication yet that it is decadent or obsolescent. Although every age has had its advocates of internationalism, the latter has not advanced beyond international cooperation. The idea of a universal government remains where it was when it was first mooted by Dante. *A priori* it seems to be an ideal corresponding to the basic unity of the human race, but it has not found support at any time to any appreciable extent, because the realities of practical life impose a different solution.

7. There is a place for a healthy nationalism and there is a need for a constructive internationalism, the latter meaning international cooperation as distinguished from international or transnational administration. The two systems do not by any means tend to cancel each other out. Indeed the ideal solution is to find a working harmony between them. At any rate, this seems to be as far as the world can hope to go for a long time to come.

Comments by Mr P. V. Askgaard: Mr Becker refers to writings of John Herz, but Herz has written a more recent article (*Polity*, Fall, 1968) indicating the nation-state is less 'dead' than he had thought. He cites these factors tending to strengthen the nation-state: (1) the demise of multinational and colonial empires; (2) the 'unavailability of force' for conquest and subjugation; (3) the continuing power of nationalism; and (4) the decline of international ideology. If it keeps internal order reasonably well, the nation-state will probably play an important role for decades to come. The concept of nation-state will change, but only very slowly. New states can be expected to guard their sovereignty jealously.

General discussion: Professor Daskalakis observed that the nation-state is just as capable of cooperation as of conflict. In particular, it can serve as an effective agent of development and change. Mr de Reuck saw the need to put the nation-state into a conceptual scheme, related to the way in which it came into being. The state is a 'community, organised as a whole, for the production of public goods' such as justice, security, or transport. Its territoriality arose from the need for military security and from the concentration of wealth, at

an early stage, in land. Functionalists say there are alternatives to the nation-state, for example: separate public authorities could control transportation, electricity or water supplies. Their territorial boundaries might be different from one another. The technical aspects of life might be dealt with on a continental basis. Other duties of the present nation-state, e.g., cultural, might become the responsibility of authorities much smaller in size. Separate elections for the programmes of these authorities could be held. The functionalists also hope that eventually no authorities will have any military functions at all, and that conflicts will be settled by law, not force.

Changes we can now anticipate, such as the tremendous pressures of population on resources, will require new orderings of political units for sheer survival, according to Mr Nesbitt. But whatever the new forms, they will have to meet the *affective* test, i.e., respond to the emotional needs of individuals in the same way the nation-state has done.

Mr Kierkegaard pointed out the need to strengthen government at levels below the nation-state, for practical reasons, but also because only thus can the management of affairs be kept on a *human* scale. Mme Jozic-Hiernaux observed that in some countries (such as Belgium) the nation is not an 'absolute' in history, nor is it necessarily able to represent the rights of minorities. To some extent, nations are accidents.

In summing up, Mr Becker reminded participants that 'a strong case can be made for man identifying with a single human species'. With TV and other powerful forms of mass communication, many children today identify more readily, for example, with children in distant parts of the world than with older people in their own community.

The Strategic Approach

By Michael Howard, Fellow in Higher Defence Studies,
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Since the term 'strategy' is now generally used to describe the use of available resources to gain any objective, from winning at bridge to selling soap, it is necessary to make clear that, in this paper, I shall use it in the traditional sense only: that is, as meaning the art of the 'strategicon', or military commander. 'The strategic approach' is thus one which takes account of the part which is played by force, or the threat of force, in the international system. It is descriptive in so far as it analyses the extent to which political units have the capacity to use or to threaten the use of armed force to impose their will on other units, whether to compel them to do some things, to deter them from doing others, or if need be to destroy them as independent communities altogether. It is prescriptive in so far as it recommends policies which will enable such units to operate in an international system subject to such conditions and constraints.

The strategic approach places major emphasis on two aspects of international politics. The first is the instability of the actors themselves. States are treated as persons in international law and deal with one another as such in diplomatic negotiation, but they are in fact corporations which do not exist in the precise and finite sense that an individual human being exists. International law recognises and legitimises their existence, but it can neither create them nor preserve them. They come into being and have their geographical extent delineated as the result of political processes in which the actual or potential use of force often plays a considerable part, and similar processes may dissolve and destroy them. Germany is only the most salient example of a State which came into existence as the result of a series of successful wars from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and disappeared as the result of unsuccessful wars in the twentieth. The United States exists as a predominantly Anglo-Saxon unit because of a war fought between 1740-1763; as a sovereign unit because of a war fought between 1776-1783; as a geographical unit embracing California and other South-Western States because of a war fought in 1846; and as a unit at all because of a war fought between 1861-1865. The Soviet Union's frontiers extend to Romania, Poland, and the Baltic as a result of wars fought between 1918-1921 and 1941-1945. Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania for the same reasons have no such sovereign independence. Poland's frontiers and at times her very existence have been determined by wars. The list can be extended almost indefinitely.

This is not of course universally and necessarily the case. The peaceful birth of the Kingdom of Norway is an attractive example to the contrary, and many States have come into existence without conflict over the past twenty-five years. Even so, this peaceful evolution was in many cases possible only because the communities concerned made clear their will and capacity to assert their independence by force if they were debarred from attaining it by any other means. The cost of holding a rebellious India—or indeed a rebellious Ireland—in check indefinitely was rated by the British as being impracticably high, and other colonial powers came ultimately to the same conclusion. Whether Angola and Mozambique take their places as independent actors on the international scene depends vary largely on the ability of the 'freedom fighters' in those countries to put the Portuguese Government under comparable strain.

There is, unfortunately, little reason to suppose that this process, of creating

and preserving States by the use or threat of armed force, belongs to a bygone era from which no conclusions can be derived applicable to the temporary international system. Israel owes her existence as a State, not recognition by the United Nations, but to her victories in the wars of 1948 and 1967. Biafra's non-existence is due equally to military causes. Whether Bangladesh emerges as a sovereign political community depends on the outcome of a military struggle and so, now, does the future of the unhappy people of Northern Ireland. Armed force may today be deployed at different levels and by different means than in the past, but it remains an element in international relations which it is dishonest descriptively and unwise prescriptively to ignore.

The second aspect of international politics on which the strategic approach lays emphasis is the function of the State as the guardian of certain value-systems; or, as David Easton has put it, its function in 'the authoritative allocation of values for a society'. Communities seek independence when they consider that their value-systems are no longer taken sufficiently into account by the society of which they have hitherto formed part and the élites which rule it. The symbols of sovereignty which they adopt may epitomise traditional value-systems, or the defiant introduction of new ones, or sometimes (as with the tricolour) an amalgamation of both. The differences between the value-systems and cultural patterns characteristic of these various communities may be minimal and nuancé, a matter more of aesthetics than of politics; but equally they may be profound; and the very survival of a value-system may depend on the capacity of the political community which has adopted it to maintain its independence in the face of outside attack.

It is, for example, difficult to see how the Soviet Union could have developed a society on Marxist principles if it had not successfully resisted the attempts of various groups, backed by foreign powers, to restore the *ancien régime* in 1918-1919. Further, it was the military incapacity of the nations of Eastern Europe to resist Soviet political domination in 1945 that led to their adoption of Marxist value-systems rather than those of the pluralistic Western communities. A conference of the kind at which this paper will be read would, if held a few score miles further East among political scientists from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, be rather different in style and the paper read distinctively uncontroversial in content. Even more different would be the tone of such a conference if the Nazis had won the Second World War and been able to impose their value-system on Western Europe. Western academics need constantly to remind themselves of certain factors in their own situation which the Marxists, to their credit, never forget. Our attitudes and aspirations, our desire to eliminate war and create a peaceful and orderly world society, our interest in applying scientific or legal methodology in order to do so, the very processes of the physical and social sciences themselves, all are the fruit of a cultural environment rooted in and protected by a certain kind of political system about which we must remember two things. First, its values are not universal: societies have existed in the recent past which have regarded war and violence not simply as acceptable but as positively desirable social activities, and the state of the world is not yet such that the permanent disappearance of such attitudes can be taken for granted. Secondly, the political system which makes possible our cultural activities and aspirations is not immortal. It is as vulnerable as any other in history to destruction from without and disruption from within. A scholar's awareness of this situation is likely to be the more acute if his formative years were passed in Europe—especially Central Europe—between 1919 and 1939. The strategic approach to international relations is rooted in this consciousness of the vulnerability of the cultural and political base from which the political scientist operates. He may need the soldier and the policeman to create a favourable environment in which he can discover how to dispense with their services.

The problem of the control and legitimisation of military power has been a central concern of writers on international relations since Grotius wrote his *De Jure Pacis et Belli* at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It was in general accepted that if States wished to maintain their independence they needed weapons for their protection and that a military capability was a central element in their power both to protect themselves and to effect the processes of international society. By the nineteenth century it was widely assumed among both practitioners and theorists of international relations that the preservation of peace was a matter of ensuring a stable balance of power, although this was a doctrine from which liberal thinkers were already beginning very explicitly to dissent. The experiences of 1914-1918 brought into dominance a largely Anglo-American group of thinkers and statesmen—Lowe Dickinson, Lord Hugh Cecil, President Wilson, James Shotwell—who considered the old assumptions and prescriptions of power politics to be totally discredited and who hoped to substitute for its erratic procedures a firm system of international law and organisation preserving peace by a system of collective security not unlike the Common Law device of the *posse comitatus*: all members of the international community being bound to assist in the repression of felony—i.e. aggression—in whatever quarter it occurred.

This attempt to transfer the concepts and processes of domestic law to the international scene both oversimplified the origins of armed conflicts by the assumption that they were always initiated by simple and felonious 'aggression', and overestimated the readiness of certain major or potentially major States to accept as final the distribution of power, influence and territory of the post-war settlements. Further, how were States which accepted law and organisation as the basis for international society to deal with groups which professed a blatantly militaristic philosophy, which used force without restraint to impose their will both in internal and international affairs, and who saw international relations in terms of war, subordination and conquest? Law could be no substitute for power, for without power there could be no law: but power involved precisely those strategic considerations of force-levels, arms procurement, alliances, staff talks and availability of bases for military operations which enthusiastic protagonists of the League of Nations were so determined to avoid. It was significant that one of the slogans of the British Labour Party in the 1930s was 'Against War and Fascism' and that few people saw anything self-contradictory about this until it was almost too late.

Thus, whereas the First World War was considered by liberal thinkers to have discredited the power-oriented approach to international relations, the Second World War was widely believed to justify it. A new direction was given to a subject hitherto considered primarily in terms of international law and organisation, by the contribution of scholars who had seen and sometimes suffered at first hand the operations of unchecked power operating in support of an alien value system; notably such eminent European emigrés to the United States as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers and Klaus Knorr. In Britain E. H. Carr in his *Twenty Years Crisis* drew a sharp distinction between 'Realists' and 'Utopians' in the study of international relations: between analysing the international system as it worked in practice, and creating a model which, however desirable, bore little relation to the realities of power.

This reaction was probably an over-reaction. The 'Utopians' of the League of Nations did not ignore the factor of military power but were anxious to organise it on a more stable basis than that provided by the separate and incompatible ambitions of mutually antagonistic sovereign States. The 'realists', at least in their earlier writings, tended to equate 'Power' with military power, or at least military potential, at the expense of the capacity to influence the actions of others

through diplomatic skills, cultural affinities and ideological drives. Such an emphasis between 1940 and 1944 was not altogether surprising. Nor is it surprising that by the end of the war such 'realist' political thinkers as Nicholas Spykman, Arnold Wolfers and Hans Morgenthau had established flourishing schools in American universities which were taking as their bases the very concepts of the national interest, military capabilities and the balance of power on which American political scientists had turned their back twenty-five years earlier. Nor, finally, is it surprising that the political leaders, East and West, responsible for reorganising the post-war world should have seen their task in precisely these terms. Mao was not the only statesman of this epoch who believed that power grew out of the barrel of a gun.

British and Soviet leaders found little difficulty in visualising the post-war world as one divided into 'spheres of interest' with appropriate military power to define and maintain them. The United States was less willing to abandon the ecumenical concepts of the Wilson era. The cautious warnings of such professional diplomats as George Kennan, that Soviet power must be recognised, accepted and contained, had to contend with moralistic and legalistic views based on a monist rather than a pluralist view of the world, which saw the Soviet Union not as a power to be treated with firmness and caution, a potential adversary yet also a potential partner, but as a dangerous criminal outside the world community, to be punished for its crimes against 'peace'. Such crimes were to be deterred and, if need be, punished by a United States which this time would not, as it had in 1919, abdicate its responsibility for acting as the policeman of the world.

From 1948 onwards the United States thus adopted the 'strategic approach' to international relations which the Soviet Union had probably never abandoned. It visualised the world in terms of possible armed conflict and so conducted its policy as to maximise its military effectiveness in the event of such a conflict: much as the Powers of Europe had done between 1870 and 1914. She wooed and armed allies, attempted to intimidate neutrals and set herself the task of building up and maintaining a nuclear strike capability which would enable her to retaliate massively, at times and places of her now choosing, to Soviet aggression anywhere in the world. To this course of action West European Governments, conscious of the presence of Soviet power a few miles from their borders and unwilling to share the destiny of their East European neighbours, saw no cause to object.

As to whether this policy was necessary in order to balance Soviet power and create a stable world-system or whether it was the result of paranoid misperceptions of intent, historians are not likely to agree, and they would be foolish to attempt a judgement until they have examined the Soviet archives. Anyhow, given the absolutist traditions of American foreign policy and the natural and legitimate fears of their Western European allies, it was entirely understandable. The Russians found it as difficult as the Americans to accept the possibility and the necessity of the peaceful co-existence of their two conflicting value-systems, and it was easier for both to do so if they could rely on the security of their own bases. It was also easier for them to do so if they could be sure that any major conflict between them was likely to result in the total destruction of both.

This indeed was the situation in the mid 1950s, once both Powers had developed thermonuclear weapons and an inter-continental capability for delivering them. It was a development which compelled strategic thinkers to re-examine their presuppositions more closely than ever before. Did it any longer make sense to talk of 'fighting' a thermonuclear war? How could one deter a potential adversary from inflicting on one's own community inescapable and unacceptable destruction except by maintaining the capacity to retaliate if

he did; and how could such a capability be maintained? Could one credibly threaten the use of nuclear weapons except in retaliation for the use of nuclear weapons, and if not, did one not need a large conventional capability as well? Could nuclear weapons be used selectively to avoid civilian targets? Could they be used in anything short of all-out war? How could their use be controlled, especially in alliances? Could they be legislated out of existence and if so how?

These and cognate matters were exhaustively analysed and discussed in the ten years between 1955 and 1965 by a group of largely American thinkers: Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood and Thomas Schelling foremost among them. Although most devoted themselves largely to technical questions, and perhaps only Kissinger and Osgood would claim to be political theorists dealing in universally valid concepts of international relations, a common attitude is apparent among them that marks them as the successors to the 'realist' thinkers of the 1940s. Unlike the 'Utopians' of both the Wilson and the Dulles eras, they accepted the bipolarity, if not the multipolarity, of the world system and considered that its stability was dependent on adequate power balances. Such a power balance, they considered, might now be constructed at a far higher level of stability than ever before by the development of second-strike nuclear weapons capable of retaliating against a pre-emptive blow. Such systems were irrelevant to the low-level and peripheral conflicts which must be expected in a complex world, and appropriate armed forces must be available to deter and, if necessary, to fight these without recourse to nuclear weapons. Finally, although States would continue to need weapons-systems of various kinds to ensure their own security, such defences were always liable to be seen as a threat by potential adversaries; while technological innovation was likely to lead to competitive developments as expensive as they were destabilising. Agreements, tacit or explicit, on arms control were therefore a necessary element in international stability.

This group contained thinkers whose views often conflicted sharply, but in general they saw their rôle as being to make weapons-systems in general, and nuclear weapons in particular, contribute to the stability of a multi-polar world as well as to the defence of their own community and its value-system. As aids to clear thinking some of them used techniques of game-theory and systems analysis which were sometimes useful, sometimes not. Their success in gaining the attention of influential political and military leaders brought for many of them a degree of involvement in the formulation of US government policy which naturally earned them the odium of those, such as Professor Noam Chomsky, who disliked that policy and its results. But they were also attacked by those who, like Professor Anatole Rappoport, condemned their acceptance of terms of reference which contained the possible use of nuclear weapons at all, and who denied that the 'game' of power politics was worth playing. Much of this controversy was concerned too narrowly with the problems and options of the United States to contribute greatly to a general theory of international relations. But the critics of these strategic theorists tended to by-pass the continuing dilemma: how, if one forswears the use of nuclear weapons, does one avoid being at the mercy of those who do not; and if one abandons the game of power politics (which is anyhow not so much a game as a continuous and inescapable process of intercourse) how does one in the long run preserve, against those who do not share them, the values which led one to abdicate in the first place? A solution to this dilemma needs to be as valid for the Czechs and the Israelis as for the United States.

Criticisms of United States policy have naturally focused on American actions in Vietnam. But such criticisms have come as much from within the strategic community as from without. Such 'realists' as Hans Morgenthau

condemned from the very beginning so grandiose a vision of where American interests and frontiers lay. Others agreed with the Administration that American interests demanded a stable and friendly government in South Vietnam and that armed assistance was probably necessary to protect it against invasion from outside and subversion from within; but they considered the military methods used for this delicate task to be about as appropriate as stopping a decaying tooth with a bulldozer. 'Vietnam' has become as emotive a term for this generation as 'Munich' or 'Pearl Harbour' was for the last, and there is a grave danger that from this experience, as from those, hasty conclusions will be drawn and given a universal validity which subsequent experience will show to be entirely spurious. Nevertheless it was a strategic approach to international relations, a desire to deny an area of potential significance to an adversary, a determination to prevent the balance of power tilting to their disadvantage, that led to the American involvement in Vietnam; and that involvement illustrates very clearly certain dangers inherent in the strategic approach.

The first danger is paranoia. This originates in the quite justifiable perception that security is seldom attainable by purely passive, territorial defence. It is always desirable to have friendly territory beyond one's borders or the capacity to control the seas around one's coasts to prevent the accumulation of overwhelming forces for assault or the imposition of a blockade. If the surrounding territory is not friendly but neutral or negative, security considerations dictate that one should have the capacity to prevent a possible adversary from controlling it; if necessary by doing so oneself. So imperceptibly one may extend along a gamut, from the *microdefence*, which is the defence of one's own territory, to concepts of *megadefence*, which may appear to others to involve little short of world conquest. In 1918, for instance, the British General Staff were recommending the permanent occupation of the area between the Black Sea and the Caspian in order to protect the frontiers of India. The German General Staff at the same period were insisting on war aims involving the permanent occupation of Belgium and the French coast to the mouth of the Somme as well as the Baltic coast as far as Finland to enable them to defend Germany in a Second World War. President Eisenhower's view, that the integrity of Laos was essential to the security of the United States, was an identifiable example of the same process at work.

The second danger is a solipsism which takes account of other communities only as agents or patients in one's own strategic plans. The Soviet Union is interested in Czechoslovakia only as an element in her own security system, and will permit only such internal developments in that society as do not conflict with that rôle. For seventy years, from, 1882 until 1952, the United Kingdom treated Egypt in precisely the same fashion, as an element in her Imperial Defence System rather than as a community with legitimate interests and aspirations of its own. In the same way successive American governments have tended to see Vietnam as a pawn—or, rather, a domino—in a global strategic confrontation, an area to be defended whether the people concerned desire it or not and whose governments were to be supported or abandoned only in so far as they were prepared to co-operate in their defence. The interests of the Vietnamese people themselves became subordinated to American concepts of global security.

Finally the Vietnam conflict has underlined the greatest danger of all; that in fighting to defend a system of values one loses sight of the very values one is fighting to defend. This was no problem for societies which accept war as an intrinsic element in political life; for Nazis who quite frankly elevated brutality and violence to the status of virtues, and for Marxists who believe equally frankly that the cause of the revolution creates its own value system and that actions are permissible or otherwise only in so far as they serve, or fail to serve,

the historical dialectic. It is a problem only for Christians and humanists who see their values as absolutes. What is or is not permissible in war, what causes justify recourse to war, *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum*, have perplexed them for seven hundred years. The development of nuclear weapons has sharpened this perplexity to the point of anguish. What cause, even survival itself, can justify the infliction of death and suffering on so cataclysmic a scale? The horrifying prospect of nuclear war indeed tended to make people forget the perfectly adequate horrors of conventional war, and perhaps the worst horror which it involves, not what can happen to the victims but what can happen to the victors: their progressive brutalisation, their growing contempt for human life, their alienation from the standards they are in principle fighting to defend. Who fights with Dragons, said Nietzsche, shall himself become a Dragon.

All these dangers of the strategic approach to international relations have led men of the highest intellectual ability and academic attainments to condemn it as a totally immoral and counterproductive attitude to international politics. Those who do so, however, merely impale themselves firmly on the other horn of the dilemma: he who does not fight with Dragons may be devoured by them. A failure to adopt the strategic approach may place one at the disposition of somebody who does. One's community may become willy-nilly part of somebody else's security system, or an area contested between two rivals. The values one professes may be eliminated as inconvenient irrelevances by groups with the will and the power to do so (and those who maintain that this cannot happen have to ignore a depressingly large number of examples, historical and contemporary, to the contrary). Statesmen are normally expected to provide for the security of their communities, and those who in the past have failed to do so have not earned the gratitude of posterity. The path of strategic wisdom may often lead them to a policy of neutrality or non-alignment. It may lead them into alliances. It may lead them, as it has Israel and Yugoslavia, into a posture of self-reliance. But no statesmen --not even those of India, in spite of Mr Nehru's pristine hopes of doing so--has yet found it possible to abandon the strategic approach altogether.

The thesis of this paper may therefore be summed up as follows:

- a. Value-systems, including those which seek the peaceful resolution of international conflict, do not have a self-evident and universal validity, but are the outcome of peculiar cultural and political conditions prevalent in certain types of communities.
- b. These communities are vulnerable to violent intimidation, dispersal and physical destruction.
- c. Statesmen are expected by the communities which they guide to take whatever measures appear necessary to ensure their protection against such dangers.
- d. Unless carefully controlled, the measures they adopt may be seen by other communities as threats and therefore prove dysfunctional. They may also be destructive of the value-systems they are designed to protect.
- e. A strategic *approach* to international relations, as one approach among several being simultaneously adopted, is inevitable and necessary, so long as it is constantly qualified by other factors. A strategic *system* of international relations, that is a system oriented entirely towards conflict, is (except of course for cultures which set a high value on conflict) counter-productive since it is likely to produce conflicts rather than avert them. A strategic approach may be necessary to produce conditions of stability which will make possible continuing peace; but other, more positive measures, are needed to create peace itself.

Summary of the discussion

Comments by Professor Nils Andrén: The 'strategic approach' should be wide enough to include various forms of force, not just armed force, as a means of imposing one's will internationally. Also, while the state can be the guardian of value systems, it can interact as well with other states in protecting common interests and values.

People's views of international politics are conditioned considerably by their environment. The theorising of American specialists on power politics is noticeably influential in Europe. This illustrates the point that value systems are not only the 'outcome of peculiar cultural conditions', but perhaps just as importantly the result of external influences.

General discussion: The growth and enlargement of the Common Market highlights the decline of power politics in Western Europe, said Mr Winter. He suggested that this development would change the patterns of international relations greatly. They would be altered too by the youth culture we are facing, which calls for a new value system; there were even some youth who made a value of not having values. Mr Wolsk said that many students today are not interested in 'intellectual frameworks', but only in a searching examination of all values.

Professor Kronen pointed out the moral dilemma of the strategic approach to world politics: if the price of living like a Dragon is to *become* a Dragon, who wants it? The aim should be a common basic value system for all mankind, with, as its cornerstone, the admonition that "Thou shalt not kill" is stronger than 'Kill anyway'.

The strategic approach can be seductive, to nations as well as teachers, suggested Mr Wolsk. Was World War II, for example, caused more by lack of will and preparedness on the part of the Allies, or by the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles? The strategic approach should be supplemented by others.

Mr Becker suggested that students could learn about states and international politics by studying the school itself as a political system.

Dr Burton challenged those who seemed to think that 'strategic studies' constituted *the* starting point for effective teaching. The strategic approach would bore most present-day students, who are uninterested in preserving institutions and who are perfectly ready to challenge authority when that authority is not legitimised. It is possible that undue emphasis on the nation-state and the system of states obscures a far more important problem: change and the adjustment to change. In re-thinking political systems, one does well to consider that loyalty can be given at several levels, none of them necessarily incompatible.

There was considerable discussion of *simulation games* as a means of teaching about international politics; some teachers present knew of the method, or had used it. Developing rapidly in the United States, these games are now beginning to be used in Europe. Simulation involves various forms of role-playing in which, for example, pupils take the parts of foreign ministers and other actors in an international situation. Simulation of decision-making appears to help pupils understand current events better.

Professor Andrén suggested that in countries not employing force internationally, such games might not be relevant. There are alternatives, said Mr Nesbitt; he cited one simulation game called 'Guns or Butter', in which 'countries' that can stay out of an arms race tend to win. Mr Becker said that many of the games are often 'stacked' in some way; Professor Pick observed that this could have its dangers. Dr Burton felt that such games, if used, ought to

stress decision-making processes that will help students maximise the values they believe important. Miss Reardon suggested using several kinds of games, so that students would have an opportunity to see which systems conform best to their own aims and values. Dr Schütze counselled caution in using simulation, which might only strengthen prejudices. One needs to possess a great deal of information before one can play most such games intelligently.

Mr Jones preferred 'live' evidence, such as real documents on the interaction of European powers, to games. He cited the Humanities Projects, produced by Heinemann in England.

In summing up, Professor Howard noted:

1. That the young who profess entirely new value systems are not representative of all youth, nor are the 'new values' concordant with one another. The counter-culture is simply one aspect of the present complex Atlantic culture.

2. That the existence of force as an option for governments makes it essential that educators deal with it, yet the strategic approach is only one among several which should be used.

3. That the strategic approach will only justify itself in the long run if, by its application, conditions are so stabilised that systems can be re-structured, making the use of force no longer necessary. The motto of the strategic approach might be: 'If you wish peace, then understand the problem of war'.

The Systems Approach

By J. W. Burton, Director, Centre for Analysis of Conflict,
University College, London

I start with the proposition that the images we have of world society determine policies. Put in another way, decision makers and politicians develop policies on the basis of the assumptions they make about the behaviour of others and the nature of the world system of states. The traditional image and the one that is most widespread is the image of a system in which the state is the main actor. In this image, each is a potential aggressor.

It is easy enough to see why this image is so widespread. Originally, the prime role of the political unit, the state, city or smaller unit, was to defend its members against others. The main role of the state is still conceived to be a defensive role. Out of this kind of conception arises a language and system of thought—collective security, internal law and order, defence of the state as a legal entity, nations of domestic jurisdiction, and so on. An international organisation based on states such as the United Nations comes to be almost a conspiracy among states to assist one another, especially when they are not obtaining the support internally which would justify their existence. In a Biafran situation, a moral obligation is believed to rest on the world of states to assist against a secession movement. African states which complain that their boundaries were arbitrarily drawn and quite irrelevant, in that they cut through traditional tribal areas, seem to have agreed never to query one another's boundaries, but to help preserve boundaries.

This image or model of world society based on states has been called the 'billiard ball' model. There is the notion of different-sized balls coming into contact one with the other, the direction of each being the outcome of the relative momentum and velocity of those in contact. The contact is on the hard surface of the outside; what goes on inside within each state is of no concern to anyone else. This is domestic jurisdiction. This power model is, of course, that which was developed by the people who called themselves the 'political realists'. But political realities seem now to be forcing us away from this model because the inter-state system is more clearly merely one of many systems.

The Prime Minister of Canada when he took office said to his Foreign Office 'Let's have a total review of foreign policy, let's have a fundamental look at it, where Canada is going and what direction it should take'. A group in the Foreign Office sat down and tried to conceptualise Canada's role in world affairs. They were forced to go outside the system of the billiard ball model, outside the system of states. Canada was seen as comprising various systems and sub-systems at political, regional, federal, and municipal levels. In addition there were seen to be many functional systems such as health, education, trading, and others. Then they looked at the rest of the world. They saw not merely other states, but systems very closely linked to all their own functional systems. This is probably the first time a Foreign Office had acknowledged the inadequacies of the traditional mode of thought, the billiard ball kind of model. It is clear that there are very many systems, transactions, and inter-actions that cut right across state boundaries, and that are not necessarily under state control.

What is a system?

A system is an *inter-action between units of the same set*. If there is a trading system within a state or externally that involves inter-action between units of

the same set. There are certain properties of systems which are important. For instance, there is the property of self-maintenance, in conditions in which systems are all the time undergoing change. There are problems of adjustment to changes in the external environment. One of the essential conditions of a system is that it should have the ability to adjust to the environment; if it does not, it goes out of existence. This is not a vital matter. On the contrary, we cannot have any development without change in systems in relationship. Citizens belonging to many different systems and they change their membership as systems change, vanish, or are created.

The characteristic of traditional society is the absence of change. In the billiard ball model, various actors are interacting, touching as it were only on the surface; what is going on inside being of no concern to anyone else. These billiard balls have boundaries and indeed one of the main roles of the state seems to be to defend these geographical boundaries. But a system has none. There are points between which there is interaction. Inside each there are sub-systems of interaction. When you go into a factory, you can draw the geographical area around this factory; but the factory itself comprises a set of systems and sub-systems by which management is put into office, by which certain production and distribution activities are carried out, and so on. The total activity can be broken down and analysed in this way. Most systems at some level or other cut across state boundaries, just as factory transactions do.

It could be said that any interactions between points inside and outside states are under the control of a central authority located within the geographical boundary, and that, therefore, ultimately, the interactions are between authorities. But this is the formal, and not the practical, state of affairs. In reality, all interactions across state boundaries are not through and under the control of state authorities. Indeed one of the great problems states have at the moment is that they cannot control many interactions. This is the problem that the Soviet Union and other countries are facing at the moment.

So we have, I think, a concept of the state which is quite different from the billiard ball one of interacting entities: a cluster of systems, some of which operate mainly within the geographical boundaries of the state, many of which operate across these boundaries.

Having arrived at this point, we can see the possibilities, indeed the inevitability, of conflict between system and system. This is part of a normal developmental process. Conflict between systems tends to escalate. If we can take a simple example from the industrial field, any conflict between management and union in a particular industry tends to escalate, and management goes for help to its own federation, or ultimately to the national union. In due course, states can become involved in conflicts between industries in different countries. In the Great Depression of the 'thirties there was a threat to the textile sub-system in Britain from the whole international system of the textile industry. On the assumption that a state's role was to protect its citizens against external threats, the United Kingdom soon became involved in the competition between the textile industry of Japan and the textile industry of the United Kingdom. This conflict quickly escalated from a conflict between systems to a conflict between states because the threat to the textile system was, in political terms, regarded as something affecting the 'national interest'. Thus there was originally a conflict at a systems level which in the normal course of events would not have led to much escalation. The textile industry could have gone out of existence, the electrical industry in the South could have increased in production, attracting transfers of labour and capital. But in this case the rate of adjustment was so great that the systems themselves could not cope with it, the conflict escalated, and states were brought in. This is merely an example of a condition of conflict between system and system, giving rise to

conflict between system and state, and finally between state and state because the industrial systems concerned crossed international boundaries.

A multiplicity of systems interacting

It will be seen that it is important to make the distinction between systems and states, when analysing conflict and its escalation. By this means the spillover of domestic conflict can be traced. Furthermore, a concept of systems interacting is, I think, a more realistic one than a concept of states interacting. After all, the interaction of states is only one of many. There are many systems of interaction in world society. If we were to analyse systems separately, and superimpose one on another—traffic movements, cultural movements and so on—we would get a build-up of interactions. The 'map' of world society would be one cobweb of transactions imposed on another, and the image of world society would be one of concentrations of activity in some points and, of course, less activity in others. Such a motion helps to show that world society is not just interaction between states. It shows too the role of states. The role of the state can be a defensive role, as it has been traditionally, or it can be a role of actively intervening to assist systems to adjust to the external environment. Using systems notions, one can see much more clearly how conflict escalates. Furthermore, the emphasis all the time is on change, adjustment to change; in the state model, the emphasis is on maintaining what is, and on resistance to change.

The concept of open systems is a fairly important one. Most traditional studies of international relations deal with closed systems. They analyse the behaviour of a particular state in relation to a particular situation as though the rest of the world environment were not particularly relevant. The whole notion of system invites attention to the rest of the environment, and the response of the system to the world. A different language emerges from this different image or concept of world society. Different options are thrown open as to how one handles conflict—whether one handles it within the defensive framework or within a systems framework, endeavouring to assist adjustment to change and to the environment.

Using the systems concept in instruction

The child in school from a very early age is introduced to the billiard ball model, involving a physical map of the world showing various state boundaries. The political map which is learned in geography is the predominant image presented in teaching history. The map of the world is useful from one point of view: It shows how to get from A to B, but that is about its only use. I know that there are other uses that the map of the world has been put to. British subjects, for example, were taught about Empire and gained satisfaction from looking at world maps because most of them were pink! But the map of the world has no function other than to show how to get from A to B, and even this can be misleading, because in terms of communications, for example, one does not go from A to B as one would think by looking at the map of the world. If one were in Asia, one would not communicate from A to B. Most likely one would go through London or some other metropolitan centre, because this is the way communications are arranged. If one wants to communicate between A and B across the Atlantic, one would probably go through outer space. So even from this point of view it is not a very good model to use in early education. Worse still, it is a power model, it looks like a power model. There are large and small states, and the emphasis is on the inter-state system dominated by the more powerful states.

One could argue that this is a good starting point for children because it is simple. But distance is one of the concepts that children have most difficulty

about. Furthermore, we are introducing children to models which do not relate greatly to reality. Political reality tells us that there are many other kinds of interactions, quite apart from the interactions of states. Why start children off on a false course?

Can we introduce children to a different concept? Can we reasonably ask them to entertain a model which is not this power model, this billiard ball model? Can we introduce them to notions of systems?

Children at the primary level in new mathematics are acquainted at an early stage with *sets*. They are able, because of the use of blocks of different shapes and different colours, to get the concept of sets. They know what are the same things and what are different things. They have a concept of relationships between sets; this is the basis for systems thinking. Relationships between units of the same set, and even the notion of systems, are not foreign to children.

There is a pop programme on the BBC that starts off with great drama, 'Let all systems go' and this means something to children. Electronic systems and other systems flash on the television screen: they are the systems and sub-systems of the programme. There is a producer here doing various things, there is someone else doing various things, and there are people dancing on the floor, and presented before them is the total situation broken down into the sub-systems, and the announcer says 'Let all systems go'. Of course he is using these words because children look at space travel and the commentator says 'something has gone wrong with the electrical system'. Every child knows they do not have to take the whole mechanism of the gadget to bits. A diagram is flashed on the screen, and one can pinpoint what has gone wrong. There is a sub-system in the electrical system and one can soon find the fault. Furthermore, children are aware of the way systems interact and change, they are aware of the problems of decision-making in quite sophisticated terms, because they are aware of the need to note feed-back from the environment. They are quite knowledgeable about self-guided systems because they could not follow space travel without this. If one talks to young people in terms of cybernetic models, self-steering models, and the way in which decisions are taken, they understand. They have a basis for knowing that if, because of some obstruction, one cannot reach one's goal, he changes his direction. One then has to calculate how to change one's direction again to reach his goal. This is not complicated thinking in the space age. There is, of course, no need to use terms like 'cybernetics'. The concept of decision-making and theory about it can be dealt with in simple language, but still with this cybernetic model in mind.

Schematic representations of systems

I have here a map of the world which overcomes some of the problems of projection. It is a world drawn in fact just like a physical map of the world is drawn, but the area of the states is represented by blocks. Instead of drawing the geographical outline, the state is represented just by blocks. This is a good starting point in the sense that this is not a great break from the ordinary physical map because the space and space relationships are depicted. It is then an easy step to show the map of the world, not in terms of space, but in terms of population, the area of the block being drawn proportionally to population. Australia becomes insignificant.

This is another way of conceiving the realities of relationships between states. Superimposed on this map are the numbers of Catholics in the various countries. The darker the area the more dense the population of Catholics. It is possible to superimpose all kinds of different information; this is the beginning of seeing relationships and transactions between different areas. The same kind of map can be drawn so as to give children an image of world society according to

energy, energy being a measure of development. A different notion of political realism is presented.

These maps still do not tell us much about behaviour. There have been a few attempts to show interactions of systems. One is in the recent edition of the Oxford Economic Atlas, which depicts the petroleum industry. There are shown the points of production and consumption and the flows between. I have taken out some other transactions. Starting with the obvious ones of communications, it took three months to obtain the data to show the interactions over twenty-four hours of aircraft movements! The same thing can be done for almost all interactions. In due course one could create maps at a behavioural level which depicted the interactions of ideological, religious, and other sympathies.

Portraying integration and disintegration

Coming back to the sets for a moment, how does one explain to young people why there is in South-east Asia a total failure of much political interaction and cooperation? One can use verbal means and point to problems of ethnic differences in Malaysia, and so on. This does not mean much to young children. But they are aware of sets. The political reality is that in Asia there are many interacting sets. In Malaysia there is a Communist faction. A number can be put to it fairly accurately. There is a Chinese group. In set terms the individual can be both Chinese and Communist. There are those that identify with Malaya. They could be Chinese, Malays or Communists. There are those who are Malays and whose main identification is with other Muslims. One can identify these sets and then look at the likely external points of interest people in these sets look to when they feel threatened. The Chinese look towards Peking, the Muslims look towards Indonesia, another group looks towards Britain, and still another looks towards the United States. Now if one does the same thing with, for example, Indonesia and finds the same kinds of sets, then it is fairly clear why any attempt at integration leads to internal disintegration. It is not necessary to talk in these terms. One merely shows the sets and it becomes very conspicuous that if the same things happen in Indonesia, the Chinese will think that the attempted integration at a governmental level between Malaysia and Indonesia is aimed against the minority in each state. This sets up all kinds of internal tensions. We have the governments of this area saying 'we've made about six attempts at some kind of integration, every time it has led to disintegration internally, let us not try it again'. Even children can be led to the observation which Deutsch came to only after a lot of empirical work, that there can be integration and cooperation between different geographical areas, between different states, only once there is a high degree of integration internally. Attention is focused on an internal problem as a cause of conflict, rather than any international source. This is an insight which is otherwise reserved for post-graduates!

The aim of instruction

These notions of sets, systems, and cybernetic aspects of decision-making are not foreign to quite young people, even primary level children, because they relate so much to the basic notions to which they have already been introduced, particularly in the area of mathematics. But we need to go further. Showing sets and the diagrams to which I have referred, does not show behavioural interactions, but this can be done. Children can draw networks of railways, for example, in Europe, they can draw all kinds of other cultural interactions, they could even draw up the interactions, the sets, and the systems represented by their pen-friends. There are all manner of exercises one can

give to children which bring home to them that world society is not just an inter-state system, as represented by the billiard ball model.

What we are aiming at, surely, is to focus attention on the fundamental problems that exist in world society. I am not sure that they are the problems of power, aggression, and defence which are thrown up by the billiard ball model; they seem much more to be problems of social and political interaction and change within a state, which spill over to inter-state relationships. We have concentrated on the legal entities, the nation-states, but experience and empirical evidence in world society tell us that the legal entity is all the time being challenged, particularly if it does not have a broad basis of social and political support, if it does not have a legitimised status. We want to give children the tools with which they in the future can think about a distinction between what is legal and what is legitimised, to think about shared values across national cultures. We need to give them some way in which they can think about conflict. Conflict is endemic in all social organisations and a most desirable thing, without which there cannot be any change or any development. Conflict leads some systems to change, to go out of existence, and others to grow. We need to give children some notion about the difference between conflict which is constructive, desirable, inevitable in any event, and conflict which is disfunctional, why it is disfunctional, and how it escalates.

In teaching undergraduates, I finally end up with a simulation. It is a very unstructured one. It is an opportunity for students to try to apply whatever thinking they may have internalised. I think it is very dangerous to do simulation without previous tuition, because all one is then doing is reinforcing the notions that have been inherited, notions which derive logically from a map of the world.

The practical difficulty of using new approaches

The problem in teaching about world society at the secondary level is not necessarily a problem of content. A few years ago, if one talked to a group of people about teaching mathematics, they would throw up their hands and say, 'It is impossible to teach much mathematics at the primary and secondary levels', and yet today, clearly most primary school children know more mathematics than their parents. And they love it, it is not difficult, it is part of their play, if properly constructed with adequate teaching tools. The problems of content are not really great, I believe. The problems of presenting sets and the system process of decision-making out of which one can build the explanation of world society and of conflict, are not particularly great.

The great practical problem is the resistance of the existing establishment to any new approaches. At the tertiary level this has been a terrible problem. If one introduces a new model like this, if one introduces a new language, a different set of problems, one is seen to be destroying a lot of textbooks, and the vested interests of a lot of people. One is challenging people to think again, to read more widely, to change their courses. Different people may have to be employed, with different backgrounds, and one is faced with problems of administration which are not resolved even in a decade. Usually it takes a couple of decades before younger people come on.

I imagine that at the secondary level the problem is even worse. One is dealing at that level with a larger number of people and more entrenched positions. If someone is teaching geography and is interested in the physical map of the world, or if someone is teaching history, which is written in terms of relations between nation states, adopting a different approach means confronting a lot of people. The difficulties would probably be even greater than the difficulties which have been experienced in trying to change to what is known as 'new mathematics'.

So I think there are two separate problems here: One, the content with which we are primarily interested, and the other, having agreed on a changed content, how in fact to break down resistances so there could be the introduction of a new approach.

I know that a first reaction is that conceptual thinking of this nature is too difficult. Indeed, at the tertiary level, it is argued that International Relations should be taught only at the post-graduate level: 'give undergraduates the certainty, the firm knowledge of one discipline like the certainties of economics or physiology or something of this kind. Then let them get into this realm of uncertainty'. My own experience, teaching seventeen or eighteen-year-olds in first year, is that the rate of absorption, of internationalism, of understanding with a systems kind of approach is far greater than the rate of absorption of the more traditional approaches. Indeed there is a lot of resistance to the more traditional approach because there is a feeling that there is something not quite right about it, it is irrelevant, it is inadequate. When later, in perhaps second or third year, one introduces students to the more recent literature, they ask, 'Why did you not tell us this to start with? You pumped all this one model, one system of thought into us, and now you are trying to destroy it and to introduce another. Why do you not start with it?' In response to student comment, I now throw them into the deep end to begin with and, like ducks without previous experience, they find that they can float and paddle along quite readily. I estimate that the systems approach has cut down our teaching time by at least twelve months in a three-year course, allowing us to move forward into other areas of concern.

Summary of the discussion

Comments by Professor John Gibson: Even the small child can understand the systems approach, if one begins with the human being itself as a system, goes on to governance in the home, then the neighbourhood and community, the nation-state, and finally the world. One other advantage of the systems approach is that it deals with wholeness.

A disadvantage of the systems approach is its frequent reliance on models, which is too abstract for many children. Nor does this approach take sufficient account of variables; in reality, systems vary from day to day.

While the nation-state is a reality, transnationalism is an obviously desirable development and the systems approach paves the way for understanding it.

Comments by Mr Neshitt: Most schools are probably still using the 'billiard ball model' rather than the systems approach. Burton's methods, with their emphasis on looking at world society as a system, are attractive for teachers.

The growth of functional systems as alternatives to the system of interacting nation-states has limitations, however. There are functional and instrumental needs that promote the growth of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations, but it is unlikely that these developments will displace the nation-states. World government, if it comes at all, would more likely be an imperium of a few strong nations.

General discussion: It might be dangerous, said Professor Howard, if we were to teach children that the nation-state has no reality; bumping eventually into the outside world might then be quite disagreeable. States do exist and they continue to have a considerable capacity for controlling what goes on within their borders and to some extent outside. They may be becoming more porous, but they are still realities. The systems approach can be useful, but not if it seeks to exclude other approaches.

Mr de Reuck observed that although about 99% of the world's 'decision-

makers' appear to operate on the power theory of international politics, other hypotheses can also correspond to reality and be useful.

Miss Reardon urged that the teacher be prepared to deal with multiple realities, and with multiple perceptions of realities. He should ask his pupils what they believe the realities are, ask them what they would like reality to be in, say, twenty years, and then ask, 'How do we get from here to there?' 'To transcend our present systems, we need confrontation in the schools with other possible systems.

'The whole is the sum of its parts, commented Professor Daskalakis; over the 151 nation-states there are transnational systems, but if the states—the principal building blocks—were to disappear, most of the transnational systems would go too. The individual states are systems also. Part of the teacher's job is to explain the paradoxes of the present day—black and white, love and hate, etc. existing together. Traditional Aristotelian logic is not adequate to explain contemporary social phenomena.

Mr Wolsk thought that the systems and strategic approaches might be synthesised. It would help to get pupils to think about how systems might be changed. It is important, too, to look at analytical as well as descriptive realities; this helps to dissipate the abstractness.

The difficulty of applying new approaches in teaching was cited by Mr Wolf, who explained that his pupils had to be prepared to pass a traditional history examination. Also, materials on new approaches are difficult to get and require a great deal of extra reading for a busy teacher. Professor Pick expressed sympathy, but also urged that teachers press for curriculum changes when they believe them necessary.

Mr Kelstrup thought that one of the chief problems posed by the systems approach was that of *relevance*; which 'sets' are most important? How are different systems structured, and how do they relate to one another? With respect to nation-states: the problem is not whether they exist, but in what sense they exist. If the systems approach is not developed into a theory, then the idea of 'systems' can itself become an ideology.

For the teacher, declared Mme Jozic-Hiernaux, reality can only be in the plural. One must show pupils how complex the world is.

For Mr Fredericks, the systems approach is simply a useful way to show pupils the interdependence of nations and peoples. The old idea of filling pupils with knowledge is gone; in its place is the concept of helping them learn how much more they can and should know, and showing them useful new ways of looking at the world.

Professor Kronen stated the case for viewing teacher-training as an intermittent process, not simply a question of filling them full of knowledge once and certifying them as ready to go on teaching for ever. Various forms of sabbaticals and in-service training are essential if teachers are to be prepared for a constantly-changing world. Mr Diakiw agreed, pointing out that the rate of accumulation of knowledge and impressions has a dramatic impact on everyone today, but especially the teacher. A professor at least can be totally immersed in his particular field, but a teacher must cope with many different fields and ideas.

Dr Schütze cautioned against applying the systems approach too much as a mathematical abstraction. Reality is more complicated. Even though one world system is made up of the 151 nation-states, they are not at all equal. Each of them is changing constantly, the relationships between them are changing, and the relationships in any case are extremely subtle and probably unmeasurable.

Defending the systems approach, Mr de Reuck declared that most of our written history and journalism report acts, not behaviour. Yet behaviour is

much more important, and is the heart of functionalism. More and more of society's functions are being carried out functionally and to describe this process is not to pose an alternative to power politics, but to explain something that is going on now, and to view human affairs in a more useful way. Most human activities go on irrespective of governments. The teacher requires skill and imagination to teach about this kind of reality, to make abstract ideas into something practical and understandable. There are still gaps in the systems approach, for example, missing data and adequate techniques not yet devised for portraying facts and behaviour in systems patterns.

Technological Developments and Collective Security

By Allan McKnight, Senior Research Fellow, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex

I first became aware of the term 'collective security' as a student in the 1930s; I became aware of 'technology'* in the Australian Navy in the early 1940s. Litvinov is identified for me with the concept of collective security according to a simple meaning: 'a policy or principle in international relations designed to preserve world peace, according to which all countries collectively guarantee the security of individual countries, as by sanctions or multilateral military action against aggressors'. Similarly, technology will always have most meaning for me by recalling the tremendous advances in the equipment for anti-submarine warfare which was successively introduced during the 1939-45 war. When I compare what we started with in 1939 and what we had on board in 1945, it is the difference between a model 'T' Ford and a 1970 Cadillac.

This war was the launchpad for a process of technical improvement in weapons and weapon control and firing systems which has gone on and on over the last quarter of a century; and this continuous increase in destructive capability has occurred right across the spectrum of weapons, from the humble rifle of the foot soldier to thermo-nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. The link between armaments and technology is intimate; like Siamese twins, if you feed one, you nourish the other.

The pattern of weapons development

Weapon development follows a fairly common pattern. Here is a simplistic picture of the process in modern times: Since 1945 it is common practice to see all armed forces and their equipment and arsenals as existing for self-defence or defence of neighbouring or friendly or allied states. We no longer admit that any military capability has been created for the purpose of territorial expansion. In these circumstances, as I see it, the process starts with a given state A. Its military planners conclude that the armed forces of state B constitute a potential threat to the territorial integrity of A and recommend the forces and weaponry to insure against that threat. The defensive insurance always tends to make the forces of A superior to the forces of B, in quantity, quality, or modernity of equipment, and now B's military planners are pre-occupied by the potential threat posed by A; they press for more and better equipment, which technologists, either in B or in an exporting country, have to develop and produce. And so the spiral goes on and on. Its fullest manifestation is in the nuclear arms race between the USA and the USSR, which is at present poised on the threshold of another powerful plunge into the development and deployment of more advanced families of weapons and missiles. But it also applies at the lower end of the spectrum between newly-emerged African states, between for example Brazil and Argentine, and (just below the superpowers) between NATO and the Warsaw Bloc.

For example, SIPRI reported in its Year Book for 1968-69 that 'the world is in 1969 devoting to military uses nearly 30 per cent more resources than it

*Technology must be interwoven with science in the activities of fundamental research, applied research, experimental development, prototypes and manufacture.

was doing three years ago'. Consider these comparative percentage increases in military expenditure as between NATO and the Warsaw Pact:

Year	NATO	Warsaw Pact
1965-66	increase—14.1	increase— 5
1966-67	increase—12.8	increase— 7.9
(Warsaw is 'disadvantaged': reaction is swift)		
1967-68	increase— 1.3	increase—15.9
1968-69	decrease— 0.4	increase— 6.8

The process is the same in the Third World Countries, as these three examples show:—

1. In 1958, only mainland China possessed long range surface-to-air missiles. By 1964, ten countries possessed them; and by 1968, eighteen. The last four to acquire them were Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Syria, and Thailand.

2. Likewise, possession of supersonic aircraft spread from one country (Israel) in 1957 to 32 in 1968, the last four to acquire them being South Vietnam, Jordan, Kuwait, and Peru.

3. In Latin America during 1967-68, military expenditure increased 33 per cent in Argentina and 19.8 per cent in Peru.

Africa showed the same trends (increases in Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Kenya, Ghana and the Ivory Coast were over 20 per cent in 1967-68 or 1966-67).

This competitive escalation does not add to security, a point well made in the report on the effect of nuclear weapons (Report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study of his consultative group—UN Document A. 6858 -New York 1968) which says in paragraph 84:

'... It is worth noting that nowhere has the development of nuclear weapons made it possible either to dispense with troops on the ground or with conventional arms. Any new country which embarked on the production of nuclear weapons would soon find that it had entered a new arms race without having provided itself with the option of abandoning the old. Thus the burden of an arms race with conventional weapons is compounded as soon as a nation embarks upon the path of acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover the insecurity which would be brought about by entering the nuclear arms race would make it imperative to improve continuously the sophistication of the nuclear weapons and their delivery system, as well as measures for providing an early warning of impending attack. The nuclear arms race demands immense technological and other resources . . .'

This pressure for continuous improvement is resulting in awful nuclear developments: multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) smaller nuclear warheads with greater power, ABMs, improvement in missile navigation and target location and fire control systems. In Chemical Biological Warfare, technology seeks new lethal agents, new means of delivery, multiple rocket launchers, clustered bomblet dispersal, etc.

Illustrating the process of escalation in armaments

Is it not insane to devote a large part of the world's scientific and technological resources to the arms race? Is an arms race necessary? Robert McNamara had this to say in 1967:

'In 1961 when I became Secretary of Defense, the Soviet Union possessed a very small operational arsenal of intercontinental missiles. However, they did possess the technological and industrial capacity to enlarge that arsenal very substantially over the succeeding several years.

'Now we have no evidence that the Soviets did in fact plan to fully use that capability. But as I have pointed out, a strategic planner must be "conservative" in his calculations; that is he must be prepared for the worst plausible case and not be content to hope and prepare merely for the most probable.

'Since we could not be certain of Soviet intentions--since we could not be sure that they would not undertake a massive build-up--we had to insure against such an eventuality by undertaking ourselves a major build-up of the Minuteman and Polaris forces . . .

'Thus, in the course of hedging against what was then only a theoretically possible Soviet build-up, we took decisions which have resulted in our current superiority in numbers of warheads and deliverable megatons. But the blunt fact remains that if we had had more accurate information about planned Soviet strategic forces, we simply would not have needed to build as large a nuclear arsenal as we have today.

'Now let me be absolutely clear. I am not saying that our decision in 1961 was unjustified. I am simply saying that it was necessitated by a lack of accurate information.

'Furthermore, that decision in itself--as justified as it was--in the end, could not possibly have left unaffected the Soviet Union's future nuclear plans.

'Whatever be their intentions, actions--or even realistically potential actions--on either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side.

'It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.'

Alternative courses

There are only four possibilities:

1. Continuing increases in military capability, whether men or material, and whether in quantity or in sophistication;
2. A freeze in the current levels, which would perpetuate indefinitely any current deficiencies as between A and B as we hypothecated their motives for military decision making; or
3. A reduction in current levels.

The fourth possibility is the elimination of all weapons except small 'cadres' required for local defence, with any aggressor being met with the collective weight of the small 'cadres' of many other states. This was spelled out in both the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter, but the principle was not absolute in either instrument. The difficulties of being assured of effective collective action has led to the preservation in the Charter of the principle of each state being primarily responsible for its self-defence, either acting alone, or, collectively, in alliances.

Arm races do not breed security but insecurity. Add to this that they are completely wasteful of human and natural resources which are desperately short for international and national economic and social improvement. I believe the only logical outcome for mankind is a form of security provided by the UN, with national military capability being maintained at only the level necessary to provide forces to the UN when required.

One suggestion has been that all graduates in science and technology should refuse to work in military establishments. I do not believe this is practicable. I do believe the recent formation of societies and groups to emphasise the social responsibility of scientists will have an effect within a decade or so. It must be remembered that in OECD countries, 25 to 40 per cent of our science graduates are employed in military and related research. In passing, note that

new functions and almost certainly retraining will be necessary for this large proportion of researchers.

But I want to stress the important professional tasks to be performed by scientists and technologists in pursuance of disarmament and arms control agreements.

International control

The first resolution ever adopted by the UN General Assembly (in January 1946) called for specific proposals for the control of atomic energy and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and particularly required proposals for effective safeguards by way of inspections and other means to *protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions*'. In 1948, in the context of arms reductions generally, certain characteristics of safeguards were agreed, namely—they should be:

- technically feasible and practical,
- capable of promptly detecting violations, and
- non-intrusive and non-burdensome to member states.

This must be regarded as the remit for technology in arms control, arms limitation, and disarmament. Freeze or cutback of arms is always inhibited at birth by the fear of the other fellow cheating; each state wishes to be protected against 'the hazards of violations and evasions' by another state.

A large part of the responsibility for providing this protection falls upon technology. This responsibility can arise in two ways, making the technologist in some cases a policeman or factory inspector, or in other cases a technical assessor to a judicial inquiry. How do these analogies arise?

That first UNGA resolution referred to 'safeguards by way of inspections or other means'. In the quarter century which has elapsed since the resolution in 1946, achievements in disarmament and arms control have been pitifully few but they have shown two means of providing assurances to complying states. The first is in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the Five. That treaty provides for each non-nuclear weapon state party to submit to international inspection by the IAEA* to ensure it is not diverting nuclear material to the manufacture of weapons. That is feasible because the *sine qua non* for manufacture is one natural element, uranium. On the other hand, the draft treaty to prohibit biological arms provides for the making of allegations of contravention and their investigation. The treaty for the Denuclearisation of Latin America provides for both. Hence my analogy of policeman and examining magistrate.

The role of the technologist in arms control

What are the fields in which the technologists may be engaged in either verifying that there is no breach of an arms limitation agreement or in investigating an allegation? So far there has been an agreement, or there are negotiations for agreements, in the following fields:

- manufacture of nuclear weapons,
 - stationing of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed,
 - manufacturing of biological warfare agents or their means of delivery,
 - prohibition of underground testing,
 - manufacturing of chemical warfare agents or their means of delivery,
- and for good measure the whole gamut of particular restrictive measures involved in the SALT discussions.

*IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency.

As international inspectors the technologists have an immense range for inventive initiative. In the field of atomic energy, for example, their duty is to start in plant design in order to inhibit diversion of nuclear material and to incorporate in plants as much as and as accurate and as tamper-proof automated instrumentation as possible. This will require antecedent research and development. Although UNGA urged all states in 1955 to research methods to ensure effective control and inspection of nuclear material, my assessment is that in the decade up to 1966, something under \$3,000,000 had been spent in the world on such research. This is ludicrously small when compared with the sum spent on R & D for nuclear weapons development and the development of civilian nuclear power. Recently the UK disclosed that its annual expenditure on *all* research for the purposes of verifying arms limitation was £400,000. Most of this was spent on seismic identification of underground nuclear explosions.

There is the problem of getting governments to accord some decent priority for R & D for disarmament, but then the inventive skill of scientists and technologists will be called for.

When the role is judicial rather than policing, the possibilities of invention for the scientists and technologists are not so great. But the exercise of judicial wisdom in investigation of allegations will also challenge professional skill. There will, in my opinion, in this judicial side of the technological role, be a demand for one very distinct skill: The results of the SALT discussions, if successful, will be some freeze or cutback and the two super-powers will certainly accompany this by some means of verification against cheating. Given their advanced technology, they may easily resolve to police mutually, by means of the remote sensing capability possessed by their respective satellite systems. This will certainly be contested by some other countries who will want assurance that the two super-powers are not evading their obligations, either in collusion or not. I believe one of the tasks of the technologists outside the Big Two will be to 'audit' and form independent judgments of the efficacy of mutual satellite inspection.

You will have noticed that my propositions relating to the role of the scientist and technologist in disarmament apply *mutatis mutandis* to the protection of the environment.

In short, there is another career available to the technologist - alternative to the inventor and innovator of the new product or process. The alternative role is world policeman and magistrate which should be as satisfying, and professionally challenging, while still giving scope for invention and innovation.

Summary of discussion

Comments by Professor John Carson: It is easier to teach about weapons technology than about weapons technologists, so teachers will have to use more ingenuity in making this important subject come alive.

Three roles for technologists can be set out: 1. a moral role; 2. a political role (as formulator of policy); and 3. an administrative role, e.g., as an international civil servant in collective security organisations. The moral role has been a matter of concern for a quarter century, but the political role is newer and inclined to grow in importance, as decisions in public policy are affected more and more by levels of technology.

General discussion: To Mr McKnight's four possibilities for curbing the arms race, Professor Andrén suggested that President Nixon might be adding a fifth: he had stated that the United States would be satisfied with a 'sufficiency', rather than superiority, in nuclear weapons. This suggested one more precise, important task for the technologist: to help define where 'sufficiency' for the defending power lies. How much is enough?

Mr Holt put his finger on the moral dilemma of the technologist—as an expert, he must give answers to those who ask certain questions. But he is also a member of a community, and this raises ethical questions. In the past, to broaden the community one had to convince groups of people that they faced a common enemy; today, the only common enemy of man is man himself.

Professor Pick saw the problem of the technologist as a way of introducing problems in international affairs into the science curriculum in secondary schools.

Mr Jones opined that it is difficult to interest scientists and technologists (including incipient ones) in moral and political questions. Dr Schutze agreed, but pointed out that when top-rank scientists have been given political responsibility, they tended to react positively and constructively.

Mr McKnight thought one might naturally lead incipient scientist/technologists to think about problems of international security by starting with the concept of *safety*. A pupil would naturally be concerned with insuring his own safety in scientific experiments, and one could proceed from there. One could also illustrate the importance on unified international action by discussing the broad implications of the pollution problem.

A long discussion ensued on the value of teaching about security problems at all. Dr Burton urged that instead, the teacher treat norms of behaviour—concentrate on what is 'normal and healthy' rather than on breakdowns and disintegration. Professor André thought this unrealistic; advanced secondary pupils would already know quite a lot about conflict from their previous studies of history. Professor Pick warned that the risks of the disintegrative processes are much greater than ever before; if not checked, they might even put an end to life. It was therefore essential that children learn something about them, however unpleasant, because they will all be called on to vote. Dr Burton doubted that children were very much interested in security, but Mr Wolsk said that was largely irrelevant; if the teacher is convinced that a particular set of problems must be dealt with in the classroom, he must do the hard work of making the subject interesting and relevant in the eyes of the pupil. Mr Kelstrup observed that all pupils seem to be interested in problems connected with work; one could lead into the difficulties of the technologists' role, and world affairs generally, from this starting point.

Professor André noted a tendency among participants to generalise from their relatively narrow national experiences. Is there available an outline of what is taught about world affairs in various countries? Professor Pick recounted efforts now under way, with a Ford Foundation grant, to survey the teaching of world affairs in the United Kingdom secondary schools. A similar survey may later be conducted in the Netherlands, possibly other countries. Mr Wolsk referred to a UNESCO study on world affairs teaching, conducted by Professor Husén. Its findings suggested that children respond positively to learning about human behaviour because they are relieved to find that their parents and other adults are not entirely to blame for the sad state of the world.

Mr Wolsk also pointed out the importance of teaching about world affairs early enough; research had shown that the process of 'political socialisation' is completed for most children by the age of 12 to 13 years.

Another long discussion ensued, this time on the possibility of teaching in a 'neutral' or 'objective' way. Dr Burton maintained that history, by its very nature, is not neutral, and that the teacher stands a better chance of being objective if he is as 'totally descriptive of what is', as possible. He advocated getting all the data and using the behaviourist's approach. Mr Holt suggested that behavioural scientists were faced with the same necessity as the historians

to be selective, and that this effectively prevented complete neutrality. Professor Pick and others felt it was impossible for any teacher to be neutral and that pupils would respect the teacher more if he openly declared his own attitude on the subject at hand, and then did his best to explain all points of view.

Mr Nesbitt averred that most history, as taught, is valueless and often dangerous. But one can usefully take certain periods or themes in history to illustrate particular concepts. Mr de Reuck thought however that one could not learn from history, because 'situations are never the same'. Insofar as possible, one should seek out 'morally neutral' data to explain events.

Mr (Poul) Markussen agreed that some things, such as the civic system of an existing nation-state, could be taught about in a neutral way, but he believed it impossible to teach about nationalism or internationalism objectively. Mr Holt cautioned against thinking that it was possible to apply the methods of science to human affairs; 'one cannot make an experiment with man and then repeat it with all the factors remaining the same'.

In summing up, Mr McKnight referred to the recent report to the OECD Ministers of Science and Technology which posited a new goal for the advanced countries: the quality of life, not simply more production. This concept, too, could be fitted into the world affairs curriculum, alongside disarmament.

The Peace and Conflict Resolution Approach

By Bert V. A Röling, Director, Polemological Institute, Gröningen

My Institute is called the Polemological Institute. Polemos is the Greek word for war, and polemology is the science of war. I chose that name at the time, because when I started at my University to establish my Institute it was in the late fifties, during the Cold War. Anything which had the word 'peace' in its name was bound to fail, because peace was something that was Communistic and propaganda and not science. Therefore, I chose this name which was innocent, and a bit mysterious for most people. When I was asked for an explanation, I explained that it was research on problems of war and peace, and this is also the subject of my lecture.

Why did this interest in the scientific approach to the problems of war and peace start? Some sciences started for reasons of curiosity; people wanted to know. This science of war and peace started from anxiety, from people being disturbed by developments and becoming convinced that something should be done. Twenty-five years ago atomic weapons were introduced. At the time people said 'now we have to change our way of life'. But nothing changed. In twenty-five years since the atomic bomb, nothing has changed in international relations. This is a disturbing fact, because if we don't change, then wars will continue to be a regular phenomenon, and wars with atomic weapons are a frightening proposition.

Up to this moment, we have continued to look for peace by means of weapons. There was an endeavour to maintain peace via the United Nations. It failed because of the clash of the superpowers. Thereafter, one again sought security in weapons. NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers maintain weapons which have the function of maintaining peace by deterrence. The motto of the Strategic Air Command (that part of the US Armed Forces in charge of thermo-nuclear weapons) is, 'Peace is our Profession'. And that is true. At this moment the search for peace is through deterrence. This is complicated, especially when there are nuclear weapons, and when there are ballistic missiles able to reach their goal on the other side of the world in a few minutes. At this moment there is no possibility of preventing that those missiles, once launched, arrive at their target. Therefore, the two parties are building up second-strike capabilities. If one side starts, he may destroy a lot of the military power of his opponent. But not everything. Both parties have invulnerable, second-strike weapons: missiles with atomic weapons that are going to destroy the cities of the country that has started the attack. And when war starts, they will not hesitate to use this second-strike capability.

The possibility of first-strike capability

The new technological developments of MIRVs, and anti-ballistic missiles and, perhaps, detection of submarines may make it possible in ten years' time that one party, or perhaps both parties, might develop a disarming first-strike capability. If one can with one first strike disarm his opponent, all deterrence falls away. That is the reason for SALT, the present discussions between the US and the Soviet Union to maintain second-strike capability, to ensure that both parties will have the invulnerable missiles that are able to attack the cities of the other one. The SALT discussions, which have been called by Nixon 'the most important negotiations the US ever entered into',

are aimed at maintaining weapons directed against the civilian population. That is necessary for peace.

One might comment, first, that it is shameful that, after 2,000 years of Christianity, we look for peace through the maintenance of weapons directed against civilian populations. Secondly, this approach is not reliable, because this search for peace through deterrence is bound to fail. There are many reasons for this instability of the 'balance of terror', into which I will not go. But it is the common opinion of scholars in this field that this way of looking for peace is not sufficient. It is bound, sooner or later, to lead to war which might be the end of our culture, perhaps the end of the world. This is the problem. It is a matter of survival. And this is reality and not rhetoric. One can understand that people wonder whether something could be done, perhaps by acquiring more insight and more knowledge.

Preconditions for overcoming war

History teaches us that there were other times in which humanity was threatened by disasters. In the sixteenth century there were disasters like the plague and other epidemics. People did not know where the plague came from, and thought that it was punishment by the gods for indecent behaviour. They prayed that it would not come, but that proved insufficient. There were three things necessary to get rid of the plague and other epidemics. First, to know the causes; second, to know how those causes could be prevented; and, third, it was necessary to know how people could be induced to live in accordance with the new insights as to the causation of the plague.

These three factors are again at stake. First, we must learn the causes of war, second, we must ascertain the conditions of peace; and, third, we must find ways to bring peoples and governments to act in terms of the insights gained through peace research. This third requirement is the most difficult part of peace research. With respect to plague pestilence, the job was relatively easy. Hygienic measures had to be taken, and there were governments to give orders, to take measure to purify water and otherwise provide for hygiene, and they could compel the people to observe them. But today there is no world government. And so it is a question whether the peoples of the world are willing to change their way of life in accordance with scholarly insights into the causes of war and the conditions of peace.

The traditional concept of war

This statement that peace science is dealing with the causes of war and the conditions of peace looks very simple—more simple than it is, because the concepts of war and peace are not always clear.

It is rather clear when we talk about war. Mostly we have in mind international war, but there are also internal wars. The Biafra war is certainly something that concerns peace research. However, it is necessary to make a distinction between certain types of war. We are accustomed in literature to deal with one concept of war, the traditional concept in which war is defined as a continuation of politics by other means. That is the classical definition of von Clausewitz: 'die Fortsetzung der Politik mit Einmischung anderer Mittel'. It concerns the war started by governments because they wanted something which they couldn't get by peaceful means. This concept of war still dominates our thinking, our military strategy, our legal measures. When in the Pact of Paris of 1928 war was outlawed, it was then defined as 'a means of national policy'. That was the definition of Clausewitz. Books were written before the Second World War, as by Norman Angell, which were based on the thought that if people learned that 'war does not pay', they would not start wars any more. They were also based on the concept that war is something undertaken

intentionally, and if one becomes convinced that it does not get one anywhere, then perhaps one might stop.

Unintentional war

There is a second type of war which is perhaps also important, that is the war which starts without anyone wishing it: the unintentional, unpremeditated war, the war that comes out of misunderstanding, misperception, miscalculation, out of escalation of a crisis which cannot be controlled. When current literature discusses the chances for World War III, the Clausewitz war is nearly excluded, because no reasonable government will start a war which would be so devastating that no imaginable war aim seems sufficient justification. If we are living in the fear that World War III might occur, then we fear this second type of war, a World War III which would come without anyone wishing it, without anyone aiming at it, by escalation of some small emotional crisis, by misperception or miscalculation—namely, a war following from the risks of a risky international policy. One might even call such a war a 'traffic accident'.

The meaning of peace

Thus we have two kinds of war with which we have to reckon. It is still more difficult to see what we mean by peace. When we talk about the science of war and peace, we mean research into the causes of war and the conditions of peace. What is peace?

When we look at the United Nations, we see that it is an organisation aimed at peace. Its Charter starts by saying that the people of the UN are determined 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. That is the aim of the UN: to prevent wars. In that concept peace means no war. It is a negative description of peace, the absence of war. As a matter of fact it is very important, especially between atomic powers, that war is prevented. Still, when one tries to maintain this kind of peace, then one sees that one cannot, if conditions continue to exist in the world which are unbearable, at least for some peoples or some states. This is so because tensions would develop, and the suffering areas would stand up and start fighting to gain a better position.

Life is conflict, and one can say that the development to a better world is mostly through conflict. Emmanuel Kant, the philosopher, wrote in his *Philosophy of History*: 'The means which nature employs to bring about the development of all its potentialities is the antagonism of these potentialities in society, because in the end this antagonism becomes the cause of a social order according to justice'. So there can be no question of preventing conflict altogether. But we want to prevent the violent solution of conflicts. We realise that conflicts will always be there, and that they are a stimulating force for the betterment of the world. The 'have-nots' will always be out for change, while the 'haves' will try to maintain the *status quo*. Always this antagonism exists, and at certain moments it will lead to violence, revolution, or war. So when we realise this situation, it becomes clear that to maintain peace in its negative sense, we have to find a means of peaceful change. Our aim should also be to find a world in which the most unbearable aspects of injustice do not exist.

So we come to a second concept of peace, peace in its positive sense, according to which peace is a situation in which a world structure exists that includes the machinery for peaceful change, and which is in itself a just structure, where justice prevails. A positive construction of peace includes the notion of social justice. You might say that 'negative peace' cannot be maintained without a certain amount of 'positive peace'. Both concepts are necessary when we study the causes of war and the conditions of peace.

The need for interdisciplinary research

Research on war and peace is *problem-oriented*, and our problem is war and peace. It is *future-oriented*, because we look at the future and try to change the usual course of history. When we look back, we see wars beyond number. Wars have become unbearable in our time through the technological development of weapons. Therefore, we know that something has to change. Different courses are available. They may be discovered in the nature of man, or in the nature of the collectivity in which he lives, the state, or they may be discovered in the structure of the world. At this moment there is the structure of 140 sovereign national-states, which together form the world. So there are three units on which we have to do research: man, the state, and the world. Therefore, it is clear that this research, this science of war and peace, is *interdisciplinary*, because many branches of knowledge are necessary to cover the three fundamental elements which play a part in the process which we are studying.

There is a last important aspect of peace research: it is a *social science*. We know that in social science we look at the world in a specific manner. We cannot avoid being at the same time subject and object of our research. We all enter the field with specific biases. Our background, especially our spiritual background, plays a role. We can try to make ourselves conscious and to be aware of our biases, but we cannot avoid subjectivity. Therefore it is necessary that in many parts of the world (with different backgrounds and with different spiritual climates) peace research should be done. The findings should be confronted in open discussion. We can find many means to counteract this subjectivity in social research: by confrontation of the outcome, by our methodology, by the openness of our research. What has never been done until now, and what should be done, is research from the very start on a multicultural basis. At this moment there is talk of a world university to be established by the U.N. I hope it will develop into a kind of 'world centre of advanced studies', where the major problems of the world, such as war, poverty, pollution, scarcity of resources, and over-population, will be discussed and researched. This research should be done from the very start on the basis of a multicultural approach, where 'capitalists', 'communists', and people from the 'Third World' will be together from the very start. That has not yet been done.

The approach to the problems of war and peace in this way is based on the conviction that if the world would have better insight into the nature of war and peace, human behaviour would change. Gunnar Myrdal, the great social scientist and economist from Sweden, speaks about 'the healing effect of embarrassing knowledge'. The confidence that there *is* a healing effect in knowledge is a stimulating thought.

The need for world unity

I would like to start with one example of very embarrassing knowledge. Scholarly research leads to the thesis that for world peace a kind of federal world unity is absolutely necessary. We live in a world system of anarchy of states. The sovereign nation-state is the collectivity in which people live and which is the centre of their lives. Many scholars have done research on the intensity of national attitudes and have come to the conclusion that 90 per cent of ideology is nationalism. We think and act in terms of nationality and not in terms of humanity. That is the result of every enquiry. We think, and feel and act in terms of nationality, and at the same time this centre of human loyalty is also the centre of military power. For national sovereignty does not only mean that one has the capacity of independence of self-determination, but also that one can rely only on one's self for security. That is the reason that the main centre of loyalty is at the same time the centre of power. That is a very dangerous situation, from which it follows, that to prevent wars this system should

disappear. The price we have to pay for national sovereignty is an occasional war, and the nature of modern weapons means that war is no longer bearable.

So our first conclusion is that some kind of world unity is needed for peace. The second—and herein lies the embarrassment—is that it is absolutely impossible to realise this. We know that what we need for peace is absolutely impossible at this moment. That is the dilemma of peace research. To talk about world unity through federalism is romantic. It is unreal, because people do not want it. The gap between interests, and especially between rich and poor, is too great.

The first condition to achieve world unity is to solve the poverty problem, and how long will that take?

In the second place, differences in values are too great. We cannot have unity as long as there is a fundamental difference in attitude between the 'free enterprise system' and the 'communist system'. We cannot have world unity as long as there is the present lack of solidarity among mankind.

So for our generation and the next, there will be no question of world unity. This does not mean that peace research on achieving 'one world' has no sense. We know that we have to attain this goal, even if it is in the distant future. This part of peace research may be called the futurological part. If we do research on the future, then all kinds of other problems appear: the pollution problem, the over-population problem, and the scarcity of resources problem are all inter-related. They have a direct bearing upon one another. It might be—and in this respect one might be optimistic—that the pollution problem would have a decisive influence on people, making them more inclined to accept world federalism. The menace of world war does not have such an influence on people, because world war is something far off in the distance. In order to achieve world federalism, one would have to pay a heavy price, and one would only pay that price to prevent something. If one does that to prevent war, one would never see the results because if peace is maintained, war is absent, and one cannot see what one has prevented by the price of restricting one's national freedom. But when it comes to pollution, the consequences of not having a world system which is able to prevent certain things are clearly felt. Pollution is not a problem which can be solved by national means alone. The cooperation of the states—and a very intensive cooperation—is required. So perhaps the chances for world unity will be enhanced by the common danger that we will spoil our lives by pollution. However, this is a question which does not concern us here.

Existential peace research

So much for the futurological approach. The second approach—existential peace research—takes as its starting point the fact that we live in a war-system, in a system that causes war and will lead to war. This we cannot change; we can only try to prevent as much as possible the outbreak of wars. We can try to give ourselves the time to change gradually. Here lies the bulk of present research. It concentrates mainly on two topics, the peaceful resolution of conflict and the prevention of violent conflict.

Quite a lot of research is already under way on the resolution of existing conflicts. More important in my view is research on the *prevention* of intense conflicts. Many topics could be mentioned:

First, the *poverty problem*, including the development problem. We know that if the world continues, divided into rich and poor, there will be unrest. No peace is possible in such a world. That does not mean that the poor part of the world will fight the rich one, for it is too poor to have the weapons. But there will be civil unrest and the tendency to extreme solutions. Then the big powers will intervene, because they do not like extreme solutions. The turn to

communism, for instance, would be prevented by the US. And if conservative dictatorial regimes would be established, the Soviet Union would come in to prevent that. So as long as this poverty problem exists, there will be unrest in the Third World, and the Cold War will require the big powers to play their roles. They consider the civil unrest of essential significance to their security, and to their power relationships.

Another topic is the *arms race*, a threatening affair. In our present world, peace rests on deterrence, on the balance of power and the balance of terror. Deterrence leads to over-armament, to over-kill. In our world, a superabundance of arms is becoming a cause of tension. The escalation to ever more arms, the arms race (at this moment at an unprecedented level, with billions of dollars being spent on scientific military development) has an intensity of which most people are not aware. The arms race has a deadly logic of its own.

In the twenty-five years since World War II almost nothing was achieved in the field of disarmament except talks on the periphery of the subject. Now is the moment that something should be done to prevent the arms race itself from becoming the cause of World War III. Arms are necessary. In a system of national sovereign states, one cannot abolish arms. They can only be abolished if we have a world government. Therefore arms are necessary. But too many arms are as dangerous as too few. There is an optimum which is sufficient for defence itself and is not itself a cause of tension, fear, and hatred. So *arms limitation* is the second subject of existential peace research.

The third is *human rights*, which may be the cause of tension. Many declarations and agreements of the UN start with the recognition of human rights as a precondition of peace. In a certain way, this recognition of human rights may also help to contribute to war. If one recognises human rights, yet does not *realise* them, then the people who suffer from that non-realisation will be more inclined to revolt and to resort to violent means than before, when they were living in a kind of apathy, perhaps believing that the gods had ordained that some people should have no rights. In a way, this tension between the recognition of human rights and their non-realisation in the world is crucial. I may remind you of the resolution of the UN in which the UK was requested, even urged, to use violent means to fight the racist regime in Rhodesia. Here you have an instance where the UN, this organisation for peace, urged war in the service of justice, in the service of the realisation of human rights. This illustrates how the human rights issue can be intimately related to the war problem.

The fourth topic is extreme *nationalism*, when people support whatever their country does, with the attitude, 'my country, right or wrong'. It is also one of the consequences of living in the present sovereign-state system. The Vietnam war is an example. Many people in the US refuse to recognise that it is wrong, and stick to the belief, 'my country, right or wrong; my country is fighting there and I support that fight'. Here, strong feelings of national loyalty prevail over everything else.

Further, there is the problem of *over-population*, and also the *clash of ideologies*. Many issues contribute to tension. If we want to prevent (in this war system) the outbreak of war, we must try more than ever to change many things.

The arms trade

Most of the time we discover that nothing can be done. The next publication of the Swedish Institute for Peace Research, SIPRI, one of the finest peace research institutes in the world, will be a study on the arms trade. It shows that the arms trade is conducted for all kinds of interests, for economic and political interests, and that it contributes to tension. There are parts of the world, in Africa, for example, where states have disputes, territorial disputes, and where

one country gets its arms from the US, another from the Soviet Union, a third from France, and a fourth from England. Every time one country gets arms, the others have to match them, because they know they will be fighting one other in connection with territorial disputes. In such a situation contributing arms is a crime. Still, this 940-page book by SIPRI on the arms trade comes to the conclusion that nothing can be done at this moment; we can change nothing because it is too difficult. And here lies the problem: we see that many things are necessary, such as mutual disarmament, arms control, restriction of the arms trade, but that cannot be done because attitudes and opinions mitigate against the necessary action.

Peace teaching and peace action

And that is the reason why we come to the third aspect of peace research: how can one bring people to live up to the insights that scholarly research has produced? We see that so far peace research has had no effect at all, on the arms question, for example. With respect to the poverty problem, we know also what has to be done, but the rich countries are unwilling on their part to do what is necessary to get rid of world poverty. What can be done?

We are touching here on the question of *peace teaching and peace action*. The fact is that we have specific insights, we know what is necessary, and still nothing happens. The world is unwilling to face its problems, and it is shortsighted in the way it looks upon its interests. It is a great problem to know how the results of peace research, the scholarly insights which already exist at least on some points, can be brought to the attention of governments, of the masses, of the world -- to a world which is unwilling and shortsighted. It is not willing to be disturbed, it is not listening to things, and it is just looking for its own pleasures of the day. What can be done?

One approach is through teaching, and the overall concept is peace action, a most difficult challenge. There is perhaps no trouble in accepting that in schools more information must be given. People have to be made aware of the world in which they are living. The knowledge of world interdependence can be transmitted. There is nothing against teaching the facts. And this might have positive results, because the facts are embarrassing.

Second, the teacher would teach world unity, world consciousness, and then we enter the field of politics. We have always said that our public schools should not deal with politics, and then we taught national politics in the name of neutrality. That has been the reality, and we realise that it is necessary to do all we can to get rid of this national thinking, to foster awareness of the solidarity of the world and its interdependence. It is in our own interest, not simply charity, to teach about our long-term interest. A decision of government is perhaps required to allow this topic to be taught, but it is absolutely necessary. Teachers themselves should declare: we have a duty to fulfil: an essential role in the gradual change of attitudes and opinions.

There is also, of course, adult education through peace action. People have walked in the street, have sat down, waving flags for peace. But this has had no result at all. The necessary means of communication (and this is a common problem for peace teaching and peace action) have not yet been discovered. The peace activists talk to themselves, and not to the public. The essential question of peace research at this moment is: Are there ways of teaching, or unorthodox ways of communication which might be effective? This is the most essential part of peace research.

Whether we can gain enough time to reach world unity, whether we can gain time to postpone a world war which would end everything, depends on whether or not we find the means of effective communication, on whether or not there will be enough teaching and action, and on whether or not the quantity of peace

research, peace action, and peace teaching will have the necessary quality to make them effective.

Summary of the discussion

Comments by Mr de Reuck: Peace research is an applied branch of knowledge; like most technologies, its disciplinary origins are diverse. Its concern is not the *abolition of conflict*, but the adjustment and accomplishment of social change, with justice in view, at acceptable costs to society. This is the heart of the political process, but it is manifestly difficult to teach about. The role of the teacher in any field is to transmit the culture, but also to transmute it.

It is important to teach about peace research and conflict resolution so that people can communicate and comprehend; a 'new reality' is being created and it would be a disservice to withhold this understanding from young people. This should moreover be part of the equipment for citizenship.

Finally, understanding peace research and conflict resolution will equip many young people for future vocational roles, in the mass media, in government, and elsewhere, which will require a sophisticated knowledge of international processes.

Sociology is reaching the point where intellectual tools are available to discuss conflict at all levels of society, and especially at the international level.

General discussion: Mr Hagtvedt said he believed the sociological approach must be supplemented by the historical. The nation-state, strategy, systems approaches, and peace research could all find a place in the teaching of history. Lifting out special themes to illustrate a point is a preferable way of teaching history, but one should not and cannot ignore history altogether.

Professor Daskalakis thought it was necessary to broaden the definition of war to encompass new types of conflict. At the same time, especially in advanced countries, internal civil strife does not necessarily lead to external war.

The educational process, especially in the schools, might be geared to examine the roots of *all* violence, suggested Professor Pick. There is violence in all of us, and the teaching profession should look for ways of extracting the incubus of violence at an early age.

Professor Röling replied that in our 'nice' societies, with a good deal of justice and decent behaviour, we tend to look aghast at the violence in the world. But the present-day willingness in our societies to condone violence in certain situations suggests that we believe there is no other way to bring about some necessary changes. A short war may take less life than the structural violence it is designed to end. Absolute condemnation of violence is absolute acceptance of the *status quo*. It may be possible in our advanced societies to be against violence, but it is not possible in all parts of the world.

This point of view, responded Professor Pick, can escalate to nuclear war, and can be used to rationalise any violence. Professor Röling in turn said that a small amount of violence now might be preferred to a large amount of violence later.

Miss Reardon drew a distinction between 'legitimate violence' (e.g., enforcement of a peace plan by a police force) and other kinds. Professor Pick said that on moral grounds, however, there was no distinction. Nevertheless, our societies accept the need for legitimised violence as a means of enforcing generally accepted norms.

Mr Wolsk made a plea for applying psychology to the study of conflict; psychologists can explain the occurrence of violence, for example. History or sociology teaching both imply that the teacher imparts knowledge to the pupil, but the psychological approach begins to change the pupil-teacher relationship itself. All children have an interest in self-knowledge, which is psychology. But the teacher must reach across all disciplines.

Dr Burton made a distinction between *legal violence* and *legitimised violence*; the latter is a contradiction in terms.

Mr Huntley suggested that recurring violence in Latin America, often for quite justifiable reasons, such as the denial of human rights, has not attained the objectives sought, but has simply bred more violence. More important than theories of repression and violence are the concepts of development—social, political, economic, and civic. It is only in countries where these developmental processes have gone very far that social conflict and violence have been relatively contained.

Mr de Reuck observed that peace research often concentrates on pathology rather than health. Professor Röling replied that health could not be attained without a 'new awareness of justice'. In some parts of the world, there is unbearable injustice and authorities must realise that unless these situations are corrected, violence will result. The United States, through its education system, had used education to promote civics and patriotism in a polyglot state; we now need to foster education in internationalism.

The Collective Security Approach

By Otto Pick, Visiting Professor in International Relations, University of Surrey and Director, Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers

The basic problem of the community of states is that international law does not exist. The concept of law in society is relatively uncomplicated—a set of enforceable and well-defined rules by means of which a community regulates its affairs and relationships. The rules need not necessarily have to be 'good' in any ethical sense, though the political and social maturity of a community can be gauged by the extent to which its laws rest upon a wide consensus. Some lawyers would argue that even 'bad' rules are better than no rules at all, regarding any element of certainty as preferable to complete anarchy.

For the Romans the most important question was whether a law could be enforced—without sanction there was no law. The municipal—internal—law of political communities is enforced by the 'sovereign' authority of states which is usually strong enough to bring the rule-breaker to account and to maintain some kind of internal social balance. When governments fail to carry out this primary duty, they fall and are replaced—in pre-Maoist Chinese political theory this process was known as 'losing the mandate of Heaven'.

In simple terms (too simple for many theorists), the community of states can in certain ways be compared to the community of groups and individuals of which a state is composed. The trouble is that there is no law in the real sense of the word which could be invoked against those who break the international peace simply because there is no international law-enforcing authority capable of imposing its will upon the law-breaker.

The comparison of the international community with the nation-state breaks down at this point, and formalistic references to 'international law' only serve to confuse the issue. Public international law is nothing more than a collection of treaties, conventions, precedents and usages which are accepted by those who find it convenient to do so. Breaches of this international law occur whenever the 'national interest' seems to demand it. In other words, states are engaged in playing a ceaseless game without rules—a game for very high stakes which they are determined to win by any means which may be required for this purpose.

Aggression is, of course, the ultimate offence against international security. One of the perennial problems, which occupied the old League of Nations for many futile sessions of hair-splitting argument, was the difficulty of defining aggression in objective terms. Indeed, the simplistic view blaming individual states for the breakdown of peaceful international relations caused many difficulties in the first half of this century and impeded the analysis of the defects of the international system as a whole. Nevertheless, the quest for security has brought states together in efforts designed to prevent and to contain aggression. Two approaches have been used—they are not mutually exclusive and in some ways they are complementary.

The broad concept of collective security represents a policy designed to preserve international peace by means of a multilateral treaty or system of treaties (e.g. Locarno), if possible expressed through an international institution (e.g. the League of Nations). The rationale of this concept rests upon the assumption that the states involved believe in the sanctity of treaties and are prepared to pay more than lip-service to the idea of a world order. The

age to institutionalise collective security on a global scale is not new, although it has been expressed in very different terms in the past. The universal legal order of the Romans represented a kind of collective security, which was ultimately destroyed by the rise of the nation-state, and the nation-state prevailed even against the universalism of the Catholic Church. In modern times this universalist approach has been overtaken by the ideal of world government, which, however, has in practical terms produced nothing better than the League of Nations and the United Nations. The terminology of collective security dominated the discussions of the League, in so far as the united action of all the League's members -- it was hoped -- would be able to prevent breaches of the peace. The League failed because it had no means of coercion at its disposal; its leading member-states (Britain and France) lacked both the will and the capability to prevent aggression. Indeed, it can be argued that in the absence of a supranational decision-making capacity, the League would have been transformed into a mere instrument of Anglo-French policy even if the Western 'democracies' had been able and willing to act. The fate of the United Nations has been very similar: it has had some success in localised peace-keeping exercises, but only as long as these were carried out with the consent of the great powers and of the states directly concerned (e.g. the origins of the 'Six-Day War').

Although particularly smaller states still find some consolation in the moral authority of the United Nations, we are therefore faced with a situation where almost all states have come to the conclusion that they must seek safeguards for their security outside the framework of global international institutions.

Some are tempted to go it alone. But on the whole, in an imperfect world, regionalism has taken over where the global approach has failed, and in fact this is recognised in the United Nations Charter itself. The concept of institutionalised collective security has been reduced to the practical level by the establishment of regional organisations whose principal function consists of collectively safeguarding the security of their members. In this narrow sense of the term, collective security has become a reality in some parts of the world, if not everywhere. There are, of course, regional organisations which have no *prima facie* security function, but it can be argued that some relative measure of implied collective security flows from most regional arrangements.

Regional collective security organisations work -- when they work -- simply because it is easier for a smaller number of states to agree on a common interest in maintaining a semblance of the *status quo* and to pursue a common policy for common ends in a limited area. Basically, only states, whose specific interests coincide, will bother to join a regional organisation, and will therefore find it less difficult to stand together. A certain amount of terminological confusion is bound to arise, for it is difficult to differentiate between collective security which is restricted to a specific area, and mere self-defence embodied in alliance systems. But alliances vary greatly -- a system such as the Holy Alliance differed considerably from *ad hoc* alliances such as the various coalitions, which Britain cobbled up to contain Napoleon Bonaparte. Modern regional alliance systems, such as NATO, appear to go beyond the more narrow definition of self-defence towards a semi-permanent concept of a common security shared by a coherent group of nations, whose interests coincide in certain, if not all, areas of policy.

Regional organisations of this type make some contribution to the stability of the international system by creating interacting areas of security, and in the long run this interaction may in fact result in a more universal sense of collective security than the globally institutionalised approach. On the other hand, there is a danger when two such systems confront one another directly. In the terminology of games theory, a two-person, zero-sum game can only

have fatal results. Today's situation, however, is different; China has now entered the game and turned it into a safer and perhaps more general game for more than two players. Multipolarity prevails. Furthermore, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons exercised a restraining influence even in the bad old days of postwar bipolarity.

Some would argue that in the ultimate analysis, security (collective or otherwise) depends more on the climate of opinion than on institutions. In other words, people are secure if they feel secure. Feelings of insecurity generate fear and aggression in the individual — on the collective level this may lead to war. On the other hand, communities which *feel* secure may in consequence of this behave less aggressively, and thus in fact they will *become* more secure. Anything which helps to create a feeling of security is therefore valuable. It is in this context that some of the regional organisations of collective security have been so successful.

A discussion of the concept of deterrence lies outside the scope of this paper, but any discussion of security would be incomplete without some attempt to examine the impact of nuclear weapons. They are the ultimate threat and yet so far they have provided some guarantee of international security. At least, the deterrent effect of mutual annihilation has saved the nuclear powers from the final folly of direct military confrontation, and this state of affairs has undeniably contributed to the short-term security of us all. A new kind of collective security agreement has evolved in the area of nuclear weapons. Because of the nature of the problem, regionalism cannot serve in this case and the United Nations, with its large numbers of allegedly equally sovereign member-states, can only serve as an occasional sounding-board for the policies of the super-powers. The area of agreement and security covers primarily the USA and the USSR (and hopefully China in the not-too-distant future); at first it was implied simply because mutual deterrence worked, but lately it is becoming institutionalised on what can only be described as supra-regional levels first through the test ban treaty, later through the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and similar agreements on military uses of space and the sea-bed, and also, of course, through SALT.

The most interesting subject of study here is the analysis of the interplay and interaction between this new 'nuclear' collective security and regional security arrangements — the extent to which the former derives from the climate of security generated by the latter.

Postscript

The learning situation is interesting, but not easy. The problem does not differ very much as between senior secondary school levels and first-year undergraduate studies in universities. It is more difficult at the secondary level if the issues are presented to the non-specialist student simply as part of his learning process as a potential citizen.

Yet certain criteria apply throughout:

1. Collective security should be regarded as an extension of individual, personal security and as such the concept can become both intelligible and credible.
2. The theoretical issues involved are not particularly complex, and indeed concepts such as state, sovereignty, deterrence, regionalism, functionalism, etc. can be introduced in a relatively uncomplicated fashion by relating them to the over-riding concept of security. The difficulty lies perhaps in explaining that an abstraction such as a 'state' can in fact be an active role-player.

Summary of the discussion

Comments by Dr Walter Schütze: 'International security' or 'mutual security' might be better terms than collective security, as the latter historically connotes failure, most notably that of the League of Nations.

One can suggest a variety of criteria to be used in understanding security systems:

1. Comprehensive (e.g. NATO) vs. partial agreements (e.g. WEU or 'Test-Ban Treaty')
2. Universal vs. regional
3. Arms control measures
4. Hegemonial vs. balanced structures
5. Offensive vs. defensive/deterrent systems
6. Classic (offensive) alliances vs. new-style (defensive) alliances
7. Integrated vs. coordinated systems
8. Arming vs. disarming

The deterrence of nuclear weapons is a fundamental fact in today's world; however, it is not due to the wisdom of statesmen but rather to the existence of nuclear weapons themselves.

The teacher's main difficulty in teaching about security is to take all important elements into account, and to synthesise them.

General discussion: The idea that a sense of security can lead to better relations with outside groups is an attractive hypothesis, stated Dr Burton, but in the contemporary world it is not the case. SEATO, for example, was designed to overcome internal threats. And who threatens OAS from the outside? If one teaches along these lines, one is likely to distract students from the problems of internal change in societies.

Dr Schütze challenged Dr Burton's statement; he cited the Warsaw Pact as an alliance that had come into being because West Germany joined NATO. SEATO too had an external function: to keep North Vietnam out of South Vietnam. Professor Pick suggested that there was in reality little distinction between internal and external threats. Dr Burton said there was; if authorities reflect and protect the values of a community, then external threats are not important.

Values and Foreign Policy

By Julian Critchley, Conservative Member of Parliament for Aldershot and Editor, *The World and the School*

The rulers of democracies share several anxieties with regard to the effects of popular opinion upon a country's foreign policy. One such is the tendency of public opinion to prefer the 'easy way'. This is not to say that duties will always be shirked or dangers avoided but that it is sometimes simpler to prefer 'unconditional surrender' to the negotiation of more limited objections which are perhaps more likely to endure. Another anxiety for the makers of foreign policy is the risk of unpredictability by the public when faced with complex international events. Feelings whether of patriotism or of fear, supplant reason with responses based upon moods of the moment. There is a fear that the opinions of the many may override the wisdom of the more experienced.

If public opinion with regard to foreign policy can be both volatile and ill-informed it is necessary that the centres of decision-making are placed at least one remove away. The 'experienced' ought to be protected. England, which remains a parliamentary democracy, has an aristocratic tradition in the management of foreign affairs: a glance today at the social composition of the Foreign Office, will, despite conscious attempts at a balance, reveal this bias quite clearly.

The élitist management of the conduct of foreign affairs does not mean the disregarding of popular sentiment; it is enough that on occasion it should be tactfully ignored. However, the very act of decision can, of itself, change public opinion. An example of this was the hostility towards the introduction of conscription before the Second World War; before it was introduced 39 per cent of the voters were in favour and 53 per cent opposed, after the decision had been taken and approved by Parliament, 58 per cent approved. This may give some encouragement to the present British Government whose Common Market policy seems to lack popular support (in fact a change along these lines is more than likely for while there is a majority apparently opposed to entry, there is also a 'majority' who believe entry into 'Europe' to be in the nation's interest).

The management of foreign affairs in Britain itself is made easier by what has been recognised by psephologists as 'a general disinterestedness' in matters of foreign policy for it plays little or no part in elections; in this field, if in no other, there remains a feeling of deference. The debate takes place within the confines of the political parties and not beyond them. An example of this is the twenty-year-old argument within the British Labour Party on whether or not to support NATO and the concept of collective security. The present shift in opinion of some of the leaders of that party over the Common Market is privately justified as a means of preventing the 'left' from taking over the party. A similar debate has taken place in the past within the Conservative Party. Decolonialisation was a party decision in which party and public both acquiesced.

None the less we must still wonder whether the citizen—and the political parties which represent him, however obliquely—will have the fortitude to sustain indefinitely the costs of defence. Its acceptance has been bought in the past by the consensus between the parties on the essential issues of foreign policy. The rupture of this consensus over the Common Market (which is primarily a matter of foreign affairs) may have implications for the creation and management of foreign policy: if it does not it will be because anxieties over the

'price of butter' have translated the debate into a more familiar matter of home affairs.

What place is there for morality in foreign affairs? I would suggest that there is very little. That is not to say that 'moralists' are uncommon. Woodrow Wilson said 'We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done should be judged by the principles of individual morality'. And John Foster Dulles said, during the Second World War, 'The broad principles that should govern our international conduct are not obscure. They grew out of the practice by the nations of the simple things Christ taught'.

But is the morality of individuals applicable to the conduct of nation-states? Governments are not individuals; they are trustees. Lord Hugh Cecil said, in this context, 'no-one has the right to be unselfish with other people's interests', while Winston Churchill declared 'the Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics . . . still it is not on those terms that ministers assume their responsibilities for guiding states'. And Alexander Hamilton claimed, at the time of the founding of the American Republic, 'the rule of morality . . . is not precisely the same between nations as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare is not selfish, the guide of its actions is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter. Existing millions, and for the most part future generations, are concerned in the present measure of a government: while the consequences of the private action of an individual ordinarily terminate with himself, or are circumscribed within a narrow compass'.

These quotations are an illustration of opposite points of view. Some see acts of foreign policy as 'good' or 'bad'; others see it as either being wise or foolish. If I were obliged to answer the question 'What place has morality in foreign affairs?' my answer would be 'as little as possible'. If in foreign affairs decisions could be made on other grounds then so much the better. We should beware of the facile intrusion of moral judgements into the dealings of independent nation-states.

Individual morality is based upon the moral sense of the community. This moral sense is the basis upon which the structure of law is built up. The law in this instance is the product of an imperfect but authentic moral consensus. There is no such consensus in international life. States have much in common, the rapid exchange of communication, and need for security, but these ideas do not transcend their own selfish interests. There can be no world law until there is an international agreed morality, and whatever else may be claimed for the United Nations, it has yet to achieve this. It is a mirror, not a catalyst.

Yet we should beware of a ruthless pursuit of our own national interest. While foreign policy should not be regarded as a branch of ethics, states should take into account the legitimate interests of others. Hitler's ambitions were both 'immoral'—in that he disregarded the natural interests of others, and foolish, in that his ambitions led him, and Germany, to catastrophe. In more contemporary terms it seems that the American involvement in Vietnam was first justified, and then attacked on moral grounds. It began as a crusade to contain communism, it has ended as a squalid and unsuccessful attempt to coerce a smaller power.

But whatever the reality it does appear that a degree of idealism has to be injected into the foreign affairs of democratic states. America, in particular, has always felt herself obliged to justify her policies almost in religious terms. (Wars to end Wars.) The British have earned their reputation for hypocrisy in the past (Perfidious Albion) by practising what others have claimed to be a ruthless pursuit of self-interest while quick to reprove the 'sins' of others. France, under de Gaulle and Pompidou, is an exception. The Fifth Republic has certainly paid less attention to international opinion, and has followed her

own interest (arms for White Africa and nuclear tests) with few apologies. Even India, so long the moralist of international affairs, has safeguarded her own interests (Goa, Bangladesh) with an exercise of *Realpolitik* that Bismark might have envied.

In conclusion, the place for moral judgements in foreign affairs is a strictly limited one. The function of statesmanship is to take an intelligent view of a nation's self-interest. If statesmen base their actions upon a private morality then so much the better. One of the virtues of democracy is the need for its leaders to take account of public opinion both at home and abroad, and this sets a limit to their freedom of action. But as Reinhold Niebuhr wrote 'the obligation upon the individual is to obey the law of love and sacrifice, but nations cannot be sacrificial'.

Summary of discussion

Dr Burton commented on Mr Critchley's paper by observing that the present system in the British Foreign Office did not work well, that it 'had no collective memory' and that British diplomats were not trained in international politics. Mr Critchley pointed out that Foreign Office civil servants were selected in competition and that, in any case, it is the Cabinet and Commons which decide foreign policy. Mr Huntley said that US Foreign Service personnel probably received a good deal more formal in-service training in international politics than their British counterparts, yet the overall US performance in foreign affairs was probably no better than the British; one must look for the crucial variables elsewhere. The problem of *acquiring* knowledge, suggested Mr Wolsk, was different from that of *using* that knowledge in decision-making.

Does 'foreign policy-making' by an élite mean that one tactfully ignores the public? it was asked. Using British entry into the Common Market as a case in point, Mr Critchley portrayed the widespread feelings of humiliation and boredom among the British electorate. This led to ambiguity on the critical issue; public opinion polls show people saying, 'Yes, it is in Britain's interest to go in; but we don't like this Government; therefore we don't favour joining'. This could offer no basis for a political decision. Parliament had to do what it was elected for anyway.

Professor Pick pointed out an essential difference between foreign policy and other issues: one can feel and see such issues as inflation, pollution, or unemployment; not so with foreign policy (unless it becomes open war). In dealing with the abstractions of foreign policy, there is a danger that politicians will manipulate the public by overselling threats to get public support. One rôle of the teacher is to help inoculate pupils against manipulation by giving them a practical, at least rudimentary understanding of world affairs. Professor Daskalakis sounded a note of caution: if the teacher's job is to 'protect pupils from politicians', then the pupil may come to wonder 'who is telling the truth—the politician, my parents or my teacher?' The problem, said Professor Pick, is for the teacher to help the child correlate and interpret what he sees on TV, what he reads outside the classroom, what he hears from his parents, what he learns in school. The teacher should be a channel through which a child can obtain a reliable explanation of political relationships in the community and the world.

For example, the teacher can explain various kinds of threats to the community or state. There are, for example, not only military dangers, but political and economic pressures as well.

APPENDIX A

List of Participants

- Mr Henrik Adrian: Teacher of History and Social Science, Gentofte High School, Copenhagen.
- Mr Niels Amstrup: Lecturer, University of Århus, Denmark.
- Prof Nils Andrén: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
- Mr Preben V. Askgaard: Senior History Teacher, Gentofte High School, Copenhagen.
- Mr James M. Becker: Director, Social Studies Development Center, University of Indiana, USA.
- Dr John W. Burton: Director, Centre for Analysis of Conflict, and Reader in International Relations, University College, London.
- Mr Ernest Butler: Teacher of Social Studies, Karlsruhe High School (US Dependent Schools), Germany.
- Dr Pedro de Campos (l'avares; Special Adviser to the Minister of Education, Lisbon.
- Prof John Carson: Department of Political Studies, University of Guelph, Canada
- Mr Julian Critchley, M.P.: Conservative Member of Parliament for Aldershot, Editor Atlantic Educational Publications, London.
- Prof George Daskalakis: Panteios School of Political Sciences, Athens.
- Mlle R. Deseir: Teacher of History, Athénée Royal de Chenée, Belgium.
- Mr Jerry Diakiw: Programme Consultant, Canadian Department of National Defence Schools Overseas, Lahr, Germany.
- Mrs Judith Flacke: Chairman, Social Studies Department, General H. H. Arnold School (US Dependent Schools), Wiesbaden, Germany.
- Mr R. G. Fredericks: President, Canadian Teachers' Federation.
- Mrs Elisabeth Gazder: Assistant Director, Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London.
- Prof John S. Gibson: Director, Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs, Tufts University, USA.
- Mr Bernard Hagtvedt: Lecturer in the Teaching of History, Post-Graduate Teacher Training College, Oslo.
- Miss Luleen Handcock: Secretary, Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London.
- Mr Carl Lindhart Hansen: Educationist; author of textbooks on Civics, Copenhagen.
- Mr Jørgen Hatting: Teacher of History and Political Science, Danish Air Force Academy.
- Mr George Herrmann: Teacher of US History and Government and International Relations, Upper Heyford High School (US Dependent Schools), U.K.
- Mr Hans Mikael Holt: Teacher of History, Risskov Amtsgymnasium, Risskov, Denmark.
- Prof Michael Howard: Fellow in Higher Defence Studies, All Souls College, Oxford.
- Mr James R. Huntley: (USA) Writer and Consultant on International Affairs, Guildford, England.
- Mr David G. Jones: Senior History Master, Eggar's Grammar School, Alton, England.
- Mme C. Jozic-Hiernaux: Teacher of History, Athénée Royal de Vottem, Belgium.

- Mr Morten Kelstrup: Secretary of the Danish Institute of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen.
- Mr P. Kierkegaard: Headmaster, Herlufsholm School, Denmark.
- Mrs T. Kragsberger: Danish Atlantic Committee, Copenhagen.
- Prof Dr Heinrich Kronen: Pädagogische Hochschule, Freiburg.
- Mr O. Lavens: Teacher of History, Rijksmiddelbareschool Klemmerkerke, De Haan, Belgium.
- Mr Joseph Licari: Lecturer in Economics, Royal University of Malta.
- Prof James D. Logsdon: College of Education, Florida Atlantic University, USA.
- Mr Alan McKnight: Senior Research Fellow, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, England.
- Prof L.-Th. Maes: Inspector of History and Social Science, Ministry of Education, Brussels.
- Mr Per Markussen RID: President, Danish Atlantic Committee, Copenhagen.
- Mr Poul Markussen: Teacher of Social Science, Danish Air Force Academy.
- Prof Dr Mario Luiz Mendes: University of Coimbra, Portugal.
- Prof Dr Bonifacio de Miranda: Director of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon.
- Mr William Nesbitt: Center for International Progress, New York State Education Department.
- Lt-Col K. V. Nielsen: Danish Military Academy.
- Mrs. F. Van Parijs-de Graeve: Teacher of History and Sociology, Westkade, Belgium.
- Prof Otto Pick: Professor in International Relations, University of Surrey; and Director, Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London.
- Miss Betty Reardon: School Programme Director, World Law Fund, New York.
- Mr Anthony de Reuck: Research Fellow in International Relations, University of Surrey, England.
- Mr T. K. Robinson: Director, Scottish Curriculum Development Centre in the Social Subjects, Jordanhill College of Education, Glasgow.
- Prof Dr B. V. A. Röling: Director, Polemologisch Instituut, Rijksuniversiteit, Groningen, Netherlands.
- Mr Robert Saunders: Assistant Secretary/Research Officer, Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation, Canada.
- Dr Walter Schütze: Comité d'études franco-allemandes, Centre d'études de Politique Etrangère, Paris.
- Mr Charles K. Smith: Teacher of History, London Central High School (US Dependent Schools), High Wycombe, England.
- Mr Olav Sundet: Lecturer, Post-Graduate Teacher Training College, Oslo.
- Mr Henrik Tjalve: Institute of Contemporary History and Political Science, Copenhagen.
- Mr John Vernon: Assistant Director, Information Service, NATO, Brussels.
- Mr Gary Westhusin: Teacher of Social Studies, Frankfurt High School (US Dependent Schools), Germany.
- Mr Jens Winther: Associate Director, International Students Committee, University of Copenhagen.
- Mr Karl H. Wolf: Teacher of History, Pius X College, Beverwijk, Netherlands.
- Mr David Wolsk: Research Fellow, Danmarks Paedagogiske Institut, Copenhagen.

APPENDIX B

Materials for the Teacher

A number of conference participants made suggestions for this section of the Report. The bulk of available material is in book form and most of these books are usually too advanced (and some too dominated by jargon) for use by students. Most of the books included however would repay serious study by the teachers.

Audio-visual aids are relatively few and far between, though work is in progress on atlases which would illustrate the existence of interlocking systems as well as show the more traditional geographic approach.

1. The International System

There is a multitude of books describing the international system in traditional terms, behavioural theory or systems analysis. It is quite impossible to list them all within the scope of this Report, but the selection given below includes titles found useful by the conference participants.

Akzin, Benjamin: *State and Nation*. Hutchinson University Library, London 1964.
Thought-provoking study of the relationship between statehood and ethnic nationhood.

Becker, Carl: *How New Will the Better World Be?* Alfred Knopf, New York 1944.
Boulding, Kenneth E.: *The Meaning of the 20th Century*. Harper Colophon, New York 1964.

A horizon-expanding little book by a social scientist who has studied and written widely in the war-peace area. The chapter titled 'The War Trap' considers the abolition of war as largely a matter of 'social learning'.

Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. Harper & Row, New York 1962.

Burton, John W.: *World Society*. Cambridge UP 1972.

Intended for senior secondary school students. Dr Burton's contribution to this Report was based on the work he did for this book.

Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules. Cambridge UP 1968.

The most accessible statement of Dr Burton's views on international behaviour.

Conflict and Communication. Macmillan, London 1969.

Cherry, Colin: *World Communication: Threat or Promise*. Wiley, London and New York 1971.

One of the 'systems' examined by the Professor of Telecommunications in the University of London.

Cobban, Alfred: *The Nation and National Self-Determination*. Collins/Fontana Library, London 1969.

A useful paperback summary.

Davis, M. R., and Lewis, V. A.: *Models of Political Systems*, Macmillan PB 1971.

Attempt to explain various approaches to systems analysis.

Deutsch, Karl, W.: *Nationalism and Social Communication*. MIT Press 1966.

An authoritative statement about the changing impact of nationalism by a leading expert of the new methodology.

Easton, D.: *Systems Analysis of Political Life*. Wiley, New York 1965.

A lucid exposition of systems analysis.

Frankel, Joseph: *National Interest*. (Key Concepts in Political Science Series) Macmillan, London 1970.

The Professor of International Relations at Southampton University successfully defines a very complex concept.

Haas, E. B.: *Beyond the Nation State*. Stanford UP 1964.

Hinsley, F. H.: *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*. Cambridge UP 1968.

Holsti, K. J.: *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. Prentice-Hall 1967.

One of the very best discussions of the whole field of international relations. Teachers will find the author's description of international systems, with historical examples, of great value. Presents an excellent framework for conceptualising the war-peace field.

Kaplan, M.: *System and Process in International Relations*. Wiley, New York 1957.

An early, essential text.

Kedourie, Elie: *Nationalism*. Hutchinson University Library, London, 3rd ed. 1966.
Concise analysis of nationalism by University of London professor.

McClelland, C. A.: *Theory and the International System*. Macmillan, London and New York 1966.

Minogue, K. R.: *Nationalism*. Batsford (Great Ideas in Action Series), London 1967. Paper: Methuen University Paperback, 1969.

Modelski, George: *Principles of World Politics*, Free Press, New York; Collier-Macmillan, London 1972.

A recent book which attempts to bridge the gap between traditional and behavioural approaches to the study of international relations. Especially interesting on the changing role of the nation-state.

Morgenthau, H. J.: *Politics Among the Nations*, 3rd ed. Knopf, New York, 1962.

The best-known and best-written academic statement on the power theory of international relations.

Niebuhr, Reinhold: *The Structure of Nations and Empires*. Scribner, New York 1959.

Re-examination of problems of the political order in relation to the nuclear age by a great exponent of the ethics of political behaviour.

Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, SCM, London 1952 (latest edition 1963); several US editions.

Niebuhr's basic statement of faith.

Reynolds, P. J.: *Introduction to International Relations*. Longmans, London 1971.

A valuable paperback—explaining new approaches to the study of international relations in straightforward terms.

Rosenau, James N. (ed.): *Linkage Politics on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. Collier-Macmillan, New York 1961.

Sewell, J. P.: *Functionalism and World Politics*. Princeton UP 1966.

Wallace, William: *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*. Macmillan PB 1971.

An excellent introductory text on the interaction between foreign and domestic policy.

Ward, Barbara: *Nationalism and Ideology*. Norton, New York 1966. Hamish Hamilton, London 1967.

A well-written plaidoyer for the replacement of the nation-state, portrayed as politically divisive, economically inadequate and socially 'providing no satisfactory answer to man's demands for meaning in his life'.

Articles suggested by participants to the conference

Archibald, K. A.: 'Three Views of Experts' Role in Policymaking: Systems Analysis, Incrementalism and the Clinical Approach', *Rand Report*, Rand Corp. Santa Monica, Ca. January 1970, p. 4292.

Bouthoul, Gaston: 'Euphorie européenne et agressivité mondiale', *Le Monde*, 15 July 1972.

Hassner, Pierre: 'The Nation State and National Self-Determination', *Survey*, London, No. 67 (April 1968).

Herz, J. H.: 'Rise and Demise of the Territorial State', *World Politics*, Vol. IX, No. 4. *The World and the School*, No. 23 (October 1971) (Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London) deals with 'the Nation State'. It contains articles by Prof John S. Gibson, Michael Banks, Dr Russell Lewis, Dr Roger Morgan, Prof H. Kronen and Julian Critchley M.P., as well as a comprehensive bibliography.

2. Conflict, War, Security and Peace

An attempt has been made to make this section more comprehensive and to include materials in French and German. Yet again, textbooks and analytical works are pouring off the presses, particularly in the United States, and the list we have included is of necessity relative.

Aron, Raymond: *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations*. Calmann-Lévy, Paris 1962.

A great but difficult work, which delves into every aspect of the problem. *Peace and War*. Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London; Doubleday, New York 1966 (English language editions).

Ashley, Montagu: *Men's Aggression*. Oxford University Press, 1968.

Atwater, Elton, et al: *World Tensions: Conflict and Accommodation*. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York 1967. Paperback.

A balanced, clearly written and well-organised interdisciplinary discussion of factors in international conflict and means of resolution.

Bailey, Gerald: *Problems of Peace*. Ginn, London 1970.

A realistic and fair treatment, suitable for the intermediate student.

Bell, Coral: *Conventions of Crisis*. Oxford UP 1971.

A recent and stimulating case study of crisis management.

Bouthoul, Gaston: *Traité de Polémologie*. Payot, Paris 1970.

The latest work by France's most prolific writer on conflict analysis.

Buchan, Alan: *War in Modern Society: An Introduction*. Harper Colophon, New York 1968. PB; Watts, London 1969.

A concise, balanced, readable interdisciplinary introduction to the causes of war, its changing nature in history, the dangers in the nation-state international system, and various possibilities for controlling war. Perhaps the best short, single volume on war and war prevention, in an historical context, to be found.

Cantril, Hadley: *Tensions that Cause Wars*. University of Illinois Press, 1950.

Henderson, James (ed.): *World Questions: a study guide*. Methuen Educational, London 1970 (3rd ed).

A well-established study guide, including case studies, discussion of teaching methods and suggestions for films and other teaching aids.

Frank, Jerome D.: *Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace*. Vintage, New York 1968. PB.

He discusses the obstacles to and possibilities for reducing violence and the need for world order under law. He concludes that education and improvements in child-rearing must be our 'main reliance'.

Frei, Daniel: *Kriegsrechtlung und Friedenssicherung: Eine Einführung in die Probleme der internationalen Beziehungen*. Stuttgart 1970.

Friedman, Julian R., et al.: *Alliance in International Politics*. Allyn & Bacon, Boston 1970 PB.

A collection of papers useful as a basis for a course dealing with the concept of alliance.

Galtung, Johan: *Theories of Conflict*. Oslo 1968.

One of the basic theoretical works dealing with conflict analysis.

Glover, E.: *War, Sadism and Pacifism*. Allen & Unwin, London 1946.

Hollins, Elizabeth Jay (ed.): *Peace is Possible: A Reader on World Order*. Crossman, New York 1966. PB. Also available, Robert S. Hirschfeld, *A Study Guide for Peace is Possible*, 11-12 grades. PB.

Perhaps the best collection of reading for considering the need to prevent war and what can be done about it.

Kaiser, Karl: *Friedensforschung in der Bundesrepublik*. (Denkschrift), Göttingen 1970.

Lorenz, Konrad: *On Aggression*. Methuen, London 1966.

A zoologist's analysis of human aggression.

Menke-Gluckert, Peter: *Friedensstrategie: Wissenschaftliche Techniken beeinflussen die Politik*. Hamburg 1969.

Nicholson, Michael: *Conflict Analysis*. English Universities Press, London 1970.

A succinct account of the main principles of conflict analysis.

Nerlich, Uwe: *Krieg und Frieden im industriellen Zeitalter. Krieg und Frieden in der modernen Staatswelt*. Band I und II—Beiträge der Sozialwissenschaft. Gütersloh 1966.

Neustadt, Richard E.: *Alliance Politics*. Columbia UP 1970.

An important study of how governments interact in crisis situations.

Nye, J. S.: *Peace in Paris*. Little, Brown, Boston 1971.

An attempt to examine the peace-maintaining functions of regional units, such as the EEC.

Perré, Jean: *La guerre et ses mutations*. Pavot, Paris 1965.

de Reuck, A., and Knight, J.: *Conflict in Society*. Churchill, London 1966.

A basic symposium on the nature of conflict.

Röling, Bert V. A.: *Leitführung in die Wissenschaft von Krieg und Frieden*. Neukirchen-Vluyn 1970.

(Based on Prof Röling's seminal work *De Wetenschap van oorlog en vrede* 1963.)

Schelling, Thomas C.: *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard UP 1960.

Sherif, Muzafer: *In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1966.

Teachers will find this a fascinating, horizon-expanding book. The opening chapter, 'When the Past Becomes a Heavy Hand', will give the history teacher new insight into how children develop images and stereotypes of others. The second chapter is an excellent survey of the question of innate aggressiveness.

Singer, J. D.: *Human Behaviour and International Politics*. Rand McNally, Chicago 1965.

Stagner, Ross: *Psychological Aspects of International Conflict*. Brooks Cole, Belmont, Ca. (Wadsworth) 1967.

Twitchett, K. (ed.): *International Security*. Oxford UP 1972.

A recent collection of essays on various aspects of the problem.

Waltz, Kenneth N.: *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Columbia UP.

An interdisciplinary approach—could be used by advanced secondary school-

students.

Waterkamp, Rainer: *Konfliktforschung und Friedensplanung*. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart 1971.

Weizsacker, C. F. von: *Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung*. Hanser-Verlag, München 1971.

Wright, Quincy: *A Study of War: An Analysis of the Causes, Nature and Control of War*, abridged edition. Phoenix, Chicago 1964 PB.

A shortened, updated edition of the original two-volume study published in 1942. Perhaps the most valuable reference source on war available.

Articles and pamphlets suggested by conference participants

Boardman, Robert: 'Simulated conflicts and international crisis games'. *The World and the School* (AICT London), No. 14, October 1968.

Bull, Hedley: 'Order v. Justice in International Society', *Political Science*, London, September 1971.

Carrère, René: 'La prospective de la menace et la polémologie', *Revue des Forces Armées françaises*, Paris, No. 262 Oct. 1969.

Derricq, Jean-Pierre: 'Tendances des recherches sur la paix', *Revue de Défense Nationale*, Paris, Août-Sept. 1971.

Ecohescu, N., and Celac, S.: 'Security and Cooperation in Europe' *Lumina* (Bucharest), reprinted in *Survival* (International Institute for Strategic Studies), London, September 1971.

Galtung, Johan: 'A Structural Theory of Aggression', *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 2 1964.

Novy, Alec: 'Soviet Defence Spending', *Survival*, October 1971.

Senghaas, Dieter: 'Zur Analyse von Drohpolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen', Beilage zur Zeitung *Das Parlament* (Hamburg), 27 June 1970.

US Department of the Army: 'Nuclear Weapons and NATO: Analytical Survey of Literature', Department of the Army pamphlet, 50-1, Washington DC 1970.

UNESCO: 'Répertoire international des institutions spécialisées dans les recherches sur le paix et le désarmement', *Rapports et Documents des Sciences Sociales*, No 23 1968.

A Report in Flemish of the proceedings of the Rungstedgaard Seminar by Omer Lavens is published in No. 3 72 of *Informatic*, Pedagogisch Centrum voor Vernieuwd Geschiedenisonderwijs (Rijksnormaalschool, Ledegankstraat 8, Gent).

3. Method

Becker, James M., and Mehlinger, Howard D. (eds.): *International Dimensions in the Social Studies*. 38th Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, Washington DC 1968.

An Examination of Objectives, Needs, and Priorities in International Education in US Secondary and Elementary Schools. A US Office of Education—Foreign Policy Association Study, 1969. Full report available from ERIC Document Reproduction Service, The National Cash Register Company, 4936 Firmont Avenue, Bethesda, Md. 20014 for \$24.60 in hard covers, \$2.00 in microfilm, plus \$0.50 in handling charges. A 19-page summary is available from the Foreign Policy Association, New York.

Eppstein, John (ed.): *National Stereotypes—an Educational Challenge*. Report of an international seminar for teachers at Elsinore, Denmark, March 1968. Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London 1968.

Papers and discussions on the images of other nations which prevail among the students of our secondary schools and universities, and what the educator can do to rectify them.

Guetzkow, Harold, et al.: *Simulation in International Relations*. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1963.

An introduction to the use of simulation techniques as a means of demonstrating the complexity of crisis situations.

Huber, Wolfgang, and Scharffenorth, Gerta: *Bibliographie zur Friedensforschung. Bd 6 der Studien zur Friedensforschung* (Pichy, Tödt) Kösel-Verlag, München 1970.

International Affairs and the Commonwealth in Education. Department of Education and Science, Curzon Street, London W.1. A handbook, revised biennially, describing sources of information for those engaged in the teaching of international and Commonwealth affairs.

King, David C.: *International Education for Spaceship Earth*. Thomas Y. Crowell for the Foreign Policy Association, New York 1971.

Helps in conceptualizing a global society and provides suggestions for specific units in secondary and elementary classrooms.

Nesbitt, William A.: *Teaching About War and War Prevention*. Thomas Y. Crowell, for the Foreign Policy Association, New York 1971, PB.

An interdisciplinary approach to the causes of war and alternative possibilities for world order aimed directly at the secondary social studies teacher.

Pickus, Robert, and Wonto, Robert: *To End War: An Introduction to the Ideas, Books, Organizations, and Work that Can Help*. Berkeley, Ca., World Without War Council, 1970 PB.

A most useful annotated bibliography many years in the making; but much more than that—its various sections are introduced by essays that can help in conceptualizing aspects of war and peace. Also includes a description of the work of organizations and periodicals. The range of materials is broad—from children's books to scholarly works, from liberal to conservative.

Ritz-Fröhlich, Gertrude: *Weltsicht und Weltverständnis im Lesebuch der Volksschule Eine Analyse mit Schwerpunkt auf der Mittelstufe. Erziehungswissenschaftliche Forschungen, Bd. I*. Beltz, Weinheim; Berlin, Basel, 1969.

Articles and pamphlets

Crick, Bernard: 'How Politics Should be Taught'. *Times Higher Educational Supplement*, London, 16 June 1972.

'Education on War, Peace, Conflict, and Change'. *Intercom*, vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 1970. Order from Center for War Peace Studies, New York.

The first part of this valuable issue of *Intercom* contains a description of what organisations are doing and what has been recently published in such areas as world affairs, arms control and disarmament, international organisation and world order, and ethics and war. The feature article is 'Education on War, Peace, Conflict, and Change', followed by a selected, annotated list of governmental and non-governmental 'Bibliography of Selected Resources' is included. 'International Education for the Twenty-First Century'. A special issue of *Social Education*, vol. 32, No. 7, November 1968. Order from *Social Education*, 1201 Sixteenth Street NW, Washington DC 20036.

Schaaf, Erwin: 'Ordnung und Konflikte als Grundproblem der politischen Bildung', Beilage zur Zeitung *Das Parlament*, 3 January, 1970.

'Teaching about War, Peace, Conflict and Change'. *Intercom*, vol. 13, No. 2, March-April 1971. Order from Center for War Peace Studies, New York.

'What Should Kids be Taught about Peace and War'. *War Peace Report*, 1971. Center for War Peace Studies, New York.

4. Audio-visual materials

Continent Without Frontiers. 16mm colour film, 37min, produced by Monitor Film for the Information Service of the European Community. Free loan from Sound Services Ltd, Kingston Road, Merton Park, London SW19.

Examines the negative historical, political, social and scientific effects of national frontiers on Europe, and looks optimistically to a future Europe without frontiers.

Europe of Prejudice. 16mm colour film, 34min, produced 1970 by Gaumont Television International for European Community Information Service. Available from National Audio-Visual Aids Library, Paxton Place, London SE27.

Historical survey of European clichés and national stereotypes, illustrating their malevolence and fallaciousness. Commentary—by Peter Ustinov—presents a contrasting picture of the allegedly internationalist climate of contemporary Europe. Reviewed in *The World and the School*, No. 20.

Versus. 16mm colour film produced for the NATO Information Service. For details of loan apply to NATO Information Service, 1100 Brussels, Belgium.

An exciting short film demonstrating the stress of conflict and the need for collective security.

The International Community. (H-001 Series.) Set of 10 transparencies. Lansford Publishing Co. 2516 Lansford Avenue, San José, Calif. 95125.

A brilliantly successful portrayal of abstract political concepts in concrete, and humorous, images. The city-state, the empire, the nation-state, the multinational state, the mini-state, etc. all explained.

War Peace Film Guide. Published by World Without War Council Publications 1970, New York.

An annotated review of some 100 films on the subject.

War and Peace. The Humanities Curriculum Project. Published by Heinemann Educational Books. Pack of 200 items sufficient for up to twenty students. Also includes two sound-tapes, two general handbooks to the project, two teachers' sets of all printed evidence and two specific handbooks on the theme of War and Peace with lists of films and other resources. Reference is made to a number of wars over the centuries, but the main emphasis is placed on the two world wars and the war in Vietnam.

Conflicts Within States - An Analysis Conflicts Between States - An Analysis. Taped discussions between Michael Banks, Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics, and Dr. Michael Nicholson, Director of the Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research. Audio Learning Limited, 24 Manor Court, Aylmer Road, London N2.

The speakers explore the manner and character of conflict and illustrate their discussion with examples from contemporary history and politics.

Conflict: Crisis Decision Making. The first in a series of case studies available free of charge from Newsweek magazine, 350 Dennison Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45401.

This package compares the historical case of President McKinley's decision to go to war in 1898 with President Johnson's decision to stop the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968. It is designed to induce the steps involved in the decision-making process and the patterns of escalation in international affairs.

Mission: A Simulation of Our Involvement in Vietnam. Interact. 35 student guides, teacher's guide. This and the following two simulations available from the Social Studies School Service, 10,000 Culver Boulevard, Culver City, Ca. 90230. Ref. INT 15.

As members of various factions, students research, then argue the viewpoints of Hawks, Doves or Moderates. They interact while assuming various identities: senators, college professors, college students, military leaders, and the President and his press secretary. Communication barriers, draft protests, popularity polls and a national Presidential election—all coalesce during a crisis situation carrying America to the brink of World War III.

Peace: A Simulation of War Peace Issues During the Wilsonian Era. Interact. 35 student guides, teacher's guide. Ref. INT 2 1.

August 1914. War has erupted in Europe. Students are grouped into five factions: Anglophiles, Francophiles, Germanophiles, Idealists and Realists. Based on their research each group must come up with specific recommendations for President Wilson during the conflict and afterwards at Versailles. Following Versailles, the scene shifts to the Senate where students group into new factions: Wilsonians, Irreconcilables, Loyalists, Strong Reservationists and Mild Reservationists. In these roles, students debate whether the United States should reject or accept the Versailles Treaty.

Crisis. Western Behavioural Sciences Institute, La Jolla, Ca. Published by Simile II. Ref. GS. 22.

Simulation of international conflict in which students form teams of three to six players to manage the affairs of six fictional nations. The nations are faced with the problem of resolving a tense situation in a mining area of enormous importance to the world. The goals of the nations are to maintain world supply of the mineral, to prevent destruction of their nation, and to bring about world peace. Students as national leaders can use written communication, debate and military force in accomplishing these goals.

Many other simulation games of varying degrees of usefulness are on the market on both sides of the Atlantic. At the Rungstedgaard seminar some participants expressed reservations about the indiscriminate use of simulation games, particularly for younger students, as in certain situations the use of simulation could reinforce existing prejudices.

5. Recommended Periodicals

Conflict Studies. Institute for the Study of Conflict, RUSI Building, Whitehall, London SW1.

Crisis Papers. Six times a year. Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, 23-25 Abbey House, 8 Victoria Street, London, SW1.

Intercom. Five times a year. Centre for War Peace Studies, New York.

International Conciliation. Five times a year. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York and Geneva.

International Organisation. Quarterly. World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass.

International Peace Research Newsletter. Occasional. Polemologisch Institut, Gröningen.

International Understanding at School. Twice a year. UNESCO Associated Schools Project, UNESCO, Paris.

Journal of Conflict Resolution. Quarterly. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Journal of Peace Research. Monthly International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

Peace Research Abstracts. 25 Dundana Avenue, Dundas, Ont.

Survival. Monthly. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Trends. Quarterly. Center for Cross-Cultural Training and Research, University of Hawaii.

War Peace Report. Monthly. Center for War Peace Studies, New York.

The World and the School. Three times a year Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London.
Etudes Polémologiques. Quarterly. Revue de l'Institut Française de Polémologie, Paris.
Stratégie. Quarterly. Institut Français d'Etudes Stratégiques, Paris.
Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung. Quarterly. Markus-Verlag, Köln.

APPENDIX C

Some Addresses for Teaching Aids and Information

Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, 23-25 Abbey House, 8 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0LA.

Provides information on world affairs teaching aids and on curriculum development in North America and Western Europe. Publications include: *World Survey* (monthly), *Crisis Papers* (six times a year), and *Correspondents World Wide* (three times a year), are of practical value to any readers interested in developments in other countries who wish to keep abreast of world events, as well as to teachers and students.

The World and the School (three times a year) is a review specially intended for teachers of international affairs in secondary schools.

Reports of international seminars and conferences dealing with teaching about world affairs are also published.

Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, University College, London.

The pioneering research establishment in the United Kingdom.

Centre for Cross-Cultural Training and Research, University of Hawaii, Box 856, Hilo, Hawaii.

Ideally situated in a multiracial environment to research into cross-cultural causes of conflict.

Centre for Research and Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

One of the major centres for academic research in the United States.

Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies, The State Education Department of New York, 99 Washington Avenue, Albany, N.Y. 12210. Undertaking a 'Studies in International Conflict' project to develop pilot units at secondary school level for the study of war and its control. Books, articles, films, simulations and curriculum materials for both teacher and high school student are available.

Center for War Peace Studies, 218 East 18th Street, New York, NY 10003.

Provides suitable material for school use.

Foreign Policy Association, 345 East 45th Street, New York, NY 10017.

Despite the reduction of its school service, still one of the most important sources of information in the United States.

Gesellschaft zur Förderung von Zukunfts- und Friedensforschung, 3 Hannover, Podbielski-strasse 257.

Produces a bi-monthly annotated bibliography on future studies and peace research.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam Street, London WC2.

The major international institute in this field: apart from monthly *Survival*, publishes occasional scholarly *Adelphi Papers* and the essential annual *Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey*.

International Peace Research Institute, Tidemans Gate 28, Oslo.

Active Norwegian organisation headed by Johan Galtung.

Internationales Schulbuchinstitut, 3300 Braunschweig, Rebenring 53, Germany.

Works to remove national prejudice from school books, through meetings of historians and teachers, exchanges of textbooks, work with publishers, and publications.

Institut français d'Etudes Stratégiques, 27 avenue de Marigny, Paris 8.

The main French centre for strategic studies.

Institut français de Polémologie, 15 avenue du Président Wilson, Paris 16.

Well-established French research institute on conflict research.

Institute for the Study of Conflict, RUSI Building, Whitehall, London SW1.

Publishes traditional scholarly case studies of conflict situations.

Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs, Tufts University, Medford, Mass 02155.

Specialises in providing materials on social studies, with some emphasis on world affairs, for use in schools.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Polemologisch Instituut, Rijksuniversiteit, Groningen.

The principal research centre in conflict studies in the Netherlands.

Richardson Institute, 158 North Gower Street, London WC1.

Concentrates on research on current international, communal and industrial disputes.

Social Science Development Center, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

Concentrates on curriculum development.

Social Studies Education Consortium, 970 Aurora, Boulder, Colorado 80302.

The ERIC Clearing House for Social Studies Education is located here: research into social studies method and curricula carried on.

Social Studies Schools Service, 10,000 Culver Boulevard, Culver City, Ca.

Sales Centre for a large stock of teaching aids with social studies and world affairs.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sveavägenä 166, S-11346, Stockholm.

Concentrates research on questions of disarmament: the Institute's Yearbook is an invaluable source of information on this subject.

World Law Fund, 11 West 42nd Street, New York, NY 10036.

Through its School Programme, helps secondary schools to introduce the subject of world order into the curriculum. Approach is 'future-oriented, value-centered, global'. Materials of many types available including a brief 'Ways and Means of Teaching About World Order' guide for teachers.

**REPORTS FROM
THE ATLANTIC INFORMATION CENTRE
FOR TEACHERS**

- 1966 *Teaching Economics in Secondary Schools: Report of the 6th Atlantic Study Conference on Education. Lisbon.* out of print
- 1968 *National Stereotypes—an Educational Challenge: Report of an international seminar for secondary school teachers, Eisinore.* 25p. \$0.60
- 1968 *Interdisciplinary Studies in Secondary Schools: Report of the 7th Atlantic Study Conference on Education. Frascati.* 40p. \$1.00
- 1969 *Teaching About the American Impact on Europe: Report of an international seminar for teachers. Füssen.* out of print
- 1970 *Learning About International Organisations: Report of the 8th Atlantic Study Conference on Education. Oxford.* 65p. \$1.60
- 1971 *Teaching About Collective Security and Conflict: Report of an international seminar Rungstedgaard.* 75p. \$1.85
- 1972 *The Interaction between Television and World Affairs Teaching in Schools: Report of the 9th Atlantic Study Conference on Education. Bordeaux.*
in preparation

For further information and bulk order rates write to:

Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers,
23-25 Abbey House, 8 Victoria Street,
London SW11 0LA